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ARTICLES 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, REMEDY, 
AND LITIGATION REFORM 
BRENDAN S. MAHER 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) rewrote the 
law of private health insurance.  How the ACA rewrote the law of civil 
remedies, however, is a question largely unexamined by scholars.  Courts 
everywhere, including the U.S. Supreme Court, will soon confront this 
important issue. 
This Article offers a foundational treatment of the ACA on remedy.  It predicts 
a series of flashpoints over which litigation reform battles will be fought.  It 
identifies several themes that will animate those conflicts and trigger others.  It 
explains how judicial construction of the statute’s functional predecessor, the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), converted a 
protective statute into a uniquely effective piece of federal litigation reform.  
Ultimately, it considers whether the ACA—which incorporates, modifies, and 
rejects ERISA in several notable ways—will experience a similar fate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tort reform is a loaded term.  Reform, after all, is multi-directional:  
it can make rules more or less friendly to plaintiffs.  For practical 
purposes, however, tort reform aims to alter legal rules so that 
plaintiffs have a harder time getting to court, winning, or collecting 
damages.  Tort reform’s larger but equally loaded cousin, litigation 
reform, is simply reform applied to all claims, not just tort.1 
For a long time, tort reform got most of the press.2  Recently, 
however, litigation reform has crept onto front and opinion pages.3  
                                                          
 1. Litigation reform is called by other names, for example “justice reform,” 
“lawsuit reform,” and “legal reform.”  See American Tort Reform Foundation, JUDICIAL 
HELLHOLES, http://www.judicialhellholes.org (last visited Nov. 7, 2013) (listing 
litigation reform organizations that employ those terms).  Although these terms can 
be used interchangeably, for the purposes of this Article, I use “litigation reform.” 
 2. See, e.g., Philip K. Howard, Why Medical Malpractice Is Off Limits, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 14, 2008, 10:29 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020448 
8304574432853190155972.html (emphasizing the enormous cost of medical 
malpractice); Alicia Mundy, Bush Legacy Could Be Found in Tort Reform, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 14, 2008, 7:53 PM), http://live.wsj.com/video/bush-legacy-could-be-found-in-
tort-reform/15854491-F804-4CCD-8D04-B912CCE9D90D.html#!15854491-F804-4CC 
D-8D04-B912CCE9D90D (assessing the George W. Bush administration’s primary 
strategy related to tort reform, namely federal preemption); Anne Underwood, 
Would Tort Reform Lower Costs?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2009, 3:45 PM), http://prescriptions 
.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/31/would-tort-reform-lower-health-care-costs (discussing 
some of the theories behind medical practice costs and offering other explanations for 
the high cost of medical care). 
 3. See, e.g., Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/opinion/13fri1.html?_r=0 (complaining that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), “will bar 
many Americans from enforcing their rights in court and, in many cases like this one, 
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News tracks power, and the current Supreme Court is more solicitous 
of litigation reform—and more willing to act on that preference—
than any Court in living memory.  Since John G. Roberts, Jr. became 
Chief Justice in 2005, the Court has issued landmark decisions 
regarding pleading, arbitration, and class actions that have 
significantly curtailed plaintiffs’ abilities to bring and win lawsuits.4  
Whether that is desirable, disastrous, or somewhere in between 
depends on your point of view. 
Litigation reform is particularly relevant to health care legislation.  
Health insurance is a contentious matter, in both the grand and petty 
sense.  Policy intuitions differ fiercely, and there are frequent 
coverage disputes.  Unsurprisingly, the appropriate remedy for the 
wrongful denial of a health insurance claim has long been a subject 
of intense interest for litigation reformers and their opponents.5  
Overly expansive remedies are decried as wasting money on the 
litigious; overly restrictive remedies are attacked as saving money on 
the backs of the sick.  These policy quarrels are complicated by 
questions of statutory authority, namely, whether federal or state 
regulators get to decide the rules of remedy.  Further, the collective 
amount of money at stake is enormous.  
Enter the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 20106 
(ACA).  The ACA unquestionably rewrote the law of private health 
insurance in America.  Whether and how it rewrote the law of civil 
remedies, however, is an important—and, to date, completely 
unconsidered—question of statutory federalism.  This Article offers a 
                                                          
bar them from enforcing rights at all”); see also infra note 4 (listing several pro-
litigation reform Supreme Court opinions from the Roberts Court). 
 4. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011) 
(defining “common question” inquiry in class actions narrowly); AT&T Mobility, 131 
S. Ct. at 1750–51 (preempting a California law limiting the use of collective action 
waivers); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007) (requiring that a 
well-pleaded complaint contain sufficient factual allegations to demonstrate 
entitlement for relief).  The taste for litigation reform is likely related to the 
presence of a Court friendlier to business than ever.  See Lee Epstein, William M. 
Landes, & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1431, 1472 (2013) (finding a pro-business slant in the Roberts Court). 
 5. See, e.g., Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best:  The Hazards of Public Risk 
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 319–20, 332–33 (1985) (arguing 
that “tort liability is a poor vehicle for choosing risks because judges and juries have 
little capacity to make risk choices wisely”); Abigail Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s 
Assault on Litigation:  Why (and How) It Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
2323, 2329–30 (2010) (noting that is has been “long recognized [that] generalist juries 
and judges are bad at understanding, evaluating, and creating healthcare regulations”). 
 6. The legislation is actually comprised of two acts:  the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) and the Health Care 
and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).  In 
this Article, following convention, I refer to these acts collectively as “the ACA.” 
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foundation for the treatment of the ACA on remedy.  It predicts a 
series of flashpoints over which litigation reform battles will be 
fought.  It identifies several themes that will animate those conflicts 
and trigger others.  And it explains how judicial construction of the 
statute’s functional predecessor, the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 19747 (ERISA), converted a protective statute into a 
uniquely effective piece of federal litigation reform.  Ultimately, it 
considers whether the ACA—which incorporates, modifies, and 
rejects ERISA in several notable ways—will experience a similar fate. 
Part I supplies essential background by explaining the pre-ACA 
world.  Prior to 2010, the most important statute regarding health 
insurance remedy was ERISA, which governs “benefit plan” 
arrangements incident to employment, including employment-based 
health insurance.  This Part explains how ERISA’s rules on coverage 
denial claims heavily favor insurers over claimants.  Those rules limit 
available causes of action, damages, and the right to a jury.  They also 
severely restrict the availability and scope of judicial review in a way 
that surprises the casual observer.  Claimants must exhaust an 
insurer’s internal review procedures before suing in court.  If the 
plan so provides—and virtually all of them do—reviewing judges 
must “defer” to the determination of the internal reviewer and affirm 
his finding, unless it was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and 
capricious.8  Such judicial deference is due even with respect to 
conflicted review, i.e., where the party reviewing claims is controlled 
by or beholden to the party obliged to pay claims. 
By 2010, nearly 150 million people who received insurance 
through an employer were subject to ERISA and its remedial 
scheme.9  Because of ERISA’s unusual preemptive scope, state ability 
to effectively regulate employment-sponsored insurance in a claimant 
friendly way is minimal.  States can and did, however, regulate the 
vastly smaller “individual insurance” market; ERISA applies only to 
employment-sponsored insurance.  In contrast to ERISA, state 
insurance law generally takes a more pro-claimant approach, 
                                                          
 7. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)).  
 8. For explanatory purposes, in the Introduction I use “insurer” and “benefit 
plan” interchangeably.  For the purpose of my analysis, distinctions between the two 
that would matter elsewhere will not matter here. 
 9. See GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. 
TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS, 2012 ANNUAL SURVEY 1 (2012), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8345-employer-health-
benefits-annual-survey-full-report-0912.pdf (noting that “[e]mployer-sponsored 
insurance is the leading source of health insurance in America, covering about 149 
million nonelderly people”).  Because of limited statutory exceptions, a small 
number of people with employment-sponsored insurance are not covered by ERISA. 
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providing broader legal remedies, including multiple causes of 
action; interpretative doctrines favoring insureds; compensatory, 
usually consequential, and sometimes punitive, damages; and jury 
rights.  State limits on claimant rights pale in comparison to those 
imposed by ERISA. 
Why ERISA diverged so materially from state law on remedy has 
long interested scholars.  Explanations differ, but legal realism offers 
the most persuasive account.10  Judicial extra-statutory concerns about 
the cost of health care, the lack of a suitable alternative to employment-
based health insurance, and a profound skepticism toward the utility of 
remedy in general were significant, if not dominant, variables in reading 
ERISA as the judiciary has done.  How those concerns might influence 
interpretation of the ACA is an open question. 
Part II offers a conceptual summary of the ACA on remedy.11  The 
Act contemplates three remedial options for claimants:  internal, 
external, and judicial review.  Internal review refers to claim 
processes administered by insurers or their designees.  External 
review refers to claim review processes handled by “independent 
review organizations” regulated by the government.  Judicial review is 
litigation.  Having all three options is a boon to claimants; however, 
having one option limit the others may not be.  Unfortunately, the 
ACA is not perfectly clear about how the various remedial options 
interact.  Is each option actually optional?  Must one form of review be 
used before others?  Must later reviewers defer to the conclusions of an 
earlier reviewer?  Does the use of internal or external review extinguish 
judicial review or certain forms of relief?  And which regulator has the 
power to resolve these—and other significant—questions? 
Part III supplies answers.  The core notion is simple:  an insured’s 
available remedies depend on the type of insurance arrangement at 
issue.  For Type A insurance, federal regulators answer questions of 
remedy.  For Type B insurance, federal or state regulators answer, 
with the division of authority not clear.  For Type C insurance, state 
                                                          
 10. What legal realism constitutes is subject to dispute among legal philosophers.  
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 755 n.21 
(2013) (describing variant schools of legal realism).  I take no sides.  I use the term 
herein to mean, broadly, the expectation that judges bring more to bear on 
interpreting the law than reading glasses and formal logic, and that their policy 
preferences influence, sometimes profoundly, the decisional law they produce.  Cf. 
id. (identifying scholars who “conceiv[e] [r]ealism in terms of a judge’s general 
(rather than case-specific) policy or ideological preferences”).  See generally MARK 
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 120 (2009) (describing the realist view 
that “a judge given a principle articulated in some prior case could faithfully deploy 
that principle along with others equally available in the doctrinal universe to reach 
whatever result the judge thought socially desirable”). 
 11. I define remedy fairly broadly.  See infra Part I.A. 
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regulators answer, subject to a federal regulatory floor designed to 
protect consumers.12 
Type A insurance arrangements are so-called “self-insured plans.”  
Self-insured plans are benefit plans that pay their employees’ health 
costs directly, without an insurance company as intermediary.  The 
remedies for self-insured plans are defined entirely by ERISA and the 
ACA.  How the ACA modifies ERISA is clear in some ways; in others it 
is not.  Type B insurance arrangements are benefit plans using a 
group insurer to cover their employees.  These arrangements are 
governed by a complicated welter of ERISA, ACA, and state law.  The 
divisions of authority are not clear, but the ACA may expand state 
ability to regulate group insurers, at the expense of ERISA.  Type C 
insurance arrangements are individual insurance policies, which are 
governed by the ACA and state law.  The ACA’s insurance 
marketplace reforms—the mandate, limited risk underwriting, and 
subsidies—will make the individual insurance market larger than it 
has been in decades.13  That the ACA exercises power over the greatly 
expanded individual market will prompt questions about the degree 
to which the ACA displaces state prerogative on internal, external, 
and judicial review. 
Interwoven with the Article’s explanation of how the ACA’s 
remedial regime works are predictions and observations about likely 
litigation reform flashpoints.14  For each type of insurance, I highlight 
particular conflicts likely to consume litigant and judicial resources.  
For example, for self-insured plans, a key battle will likely be over the 
                                                          
 12. I use alphabetical classification to make the scheme comprehensible.  “Type 
A/B/C” does not appear in the ACA.  I consider only private health insurance, not 
Medicare or Medicaid.  See generally infra note 127 (discussing unusual private 
insurance arrangements not here considered). 
 13. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE 
PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT 
DECISION 20 tbl.3 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles 
/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf (projecting that roughly 25 
million people will receive insurance through exchanges between 2019 and 2022).  
Based on its explanatory notes, the CBO report appears to sensibly include those 
receiving coverage through employers using small business exchanges in the 
“Employer” line estimate (rather than in the “Exchanges” estimate).  Id.  Even if the 
exchange estimates include employer exchange purchases, the overwhelming 
majority of the 25 million people in the exchanges would be individual purchasers 
subject to state law.   
 14. I assume throughout, unless otherwise noted, that the current federal 
regulations are within the relevant federal agencies’ power.  In other words, the 
intent here is not to assess the degree to which agency regulations will survive judicial 
scrutiny if challenged, but rather to ask what the ACA—under the current statutory 
text and regulations—means for remedy and litigation reform.  Certainly the 
question of how agency positions on the ACA will survive challenge is important.  But 
that question requires a full-length treatment all its own.  
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degree to which judges must defer to the determinations of external 
reviewers.  For group-insured plans, a crucial dispute will be over how 
much the ACA’s amending of ERISA empowers the states to regulate 
group plans without fear of preemption.  For individual insurance, 
the central question will be whether the ACA’s regulation of all 
insurance policies can serve as a ledge to impose, nationwide, 
litigation reform features inspired by ERISA.   Other flashpoints are 
also surveyed. 
In Part IV, I step back from the specific and consider big picture 
remedial “themes” of the ACA that will animate the above battles and 
trigger others.  Given the elasticity of two jurisprudential devices likely 
to influence construction of the ACA—namely, preemption and intra-
federal statutory conflict resolution—thematic analysis bears 
heightened predictive and descriptive power.  I consider three 
remedial themes that could be advanced by interested players:  the 
ACA as consumer choice, the ACA as anti-judicialism, and the ACA as 
non-judicial justice.  Put simply, litigation reform opponents will favor 
the first, litigation reformers the second, and true federalists the third. 
The Article concludes by speculating about the ACA’s fate.  It 
could become what it reads to be:  mildly progressive federalism on 
remedy, in which states may freely fashion remedial regimes 
consistent with modest consumer-protective floors defined by federal 
agencies.  Alternatively, it could transform the nation’s system of 
health insurance remedies into some version of “ERISA for all.”  The 
former is more likely, but the latter—a litigation reformer’s dream—
is not impossible. 
I. HEALTH INSURANCE REMEDY BEFORE THE ACA 
Before beginning, I should offer a preliminary comment on the 
meaning of “remedy.”  While elsewhere it may have a narrower 
meaning, herein I mean remedy quite broadly, namely, any and all of 
the formal processes and recoveries available to an insured who is 
denied coverage. 
Health insurance remedies before the ACA were defined by two 
sources of law:  ERISA and state law, or a combination of the two.15  
ERISA governed the remedial scheme for employment-based 
insurance,16 and state law governed insurance purchased on the 
                                                          
 15. Cf. Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, Welfare Benefits, and Bad Faith:  Losing Sight of 
the Cathedral, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 387, 395 (2009) (addressing the 
inadequacy of remedies within ERISA). 
 16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012). 
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individual market.17  ERISA’s preemptive scope significantly limited a 
state’s ability to regulate remedy for employment-based arrangements.18  
Because many more people were covered by employment-sponsored 
insurance rather than individual insurance,19 as a practical matter, 
ERISA has been much more significant in defining health insurance 
remedies than has state law. 
ERISA and state law’s treatment of remedy are crucial predicates to 
the ACA’s remedial scheme, for several reasons.  First, the ACA built 
upon ERISA and state law, and, in many important respects, ERISA 
and state law are still controlling authority.  Second, regardless of any 
continued vitality or formal connection to the ACA, ERISA and state 
law’s treatment of remedy will unquestionably inform resolutions of 
the ACA’s uncertainties.  Third, as is more fully explored in Part 
III.A, the degree to which pre-ACA matters of remedy, particularly 
ERISA, were influenced by extra-statutory judicial impulses must 
factor in to any realistic appraisal of how the ACA will be interpreted. 
A. ERISA Remedy 
ERISA was enacted in 1974 to protect the pensions and health 
benefits of working Americans.20  It does not require that an 
employer offer benefits.21  However, if an employer does offer 
benefits, ERISA regulates the benefit arrangement.22 
ERISA requires that benefits be administered pursuant to a legal 
construct called a “benefit plan.”23  The plan is operated by a “named 
fiduciary,” who in turn engages other fiduciaries to administer the 
                                                          
 17. See infra Part II.C. 
 18. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (showing Congress’s clear intent to control 
regulation over employee benefit plans); see also infra Part II.C. 
 19. “Individual, or non-group, health insurance covers about 14 million 
nonelderly people in America, making it the least common source of health 
insurance.  In contrast, about 157 million nonelderly people are covered by 
employer-sponsored insurance.”  KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SURVEY OF PEOPLE WHO 
PURCHASE THEIR OWN INSURANCE 1 (2010), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation 
.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8077-r.pdf. 
 20. Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2, 88 Stat. 829, 832–33 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1001); see also Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 
(1980) (noting that ERISA was enacted after “almost a decade of studying the 
Nation’s private pension plans”).  For a detailed discussion of the interesting political 
history of ERISA, see JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY 
ACT OF 1974:  A POLITICAL HISTORY 51–52 (2004). 
 21. See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1648 (2010) (stating that 
Congress enacted ERISA to ensure employees received the benefits they earned, but 
did not require employers to establish benefits plans in the first place). 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)–(c) (establishing specific requirements for already-
existing employee benefit plans and private pension plans). 
 23. Id. § 1002 (defining any employee welfare plan or pension plan as a 
“benefit plan”).  
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plan.24  Should the fiduciary violate ERISA’s requirements or the 
terms of the governing plan document, ERISA provides various “civil 
enforcement” mechanisms to beneficiaries.25  One mechanism is a 
federally created cause of action to remediate a wrongfully denied 
health benefit.26  This statutory remedy is set forth in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) and is often shorthanded as the “benefits” remedy.27  
If, for example, the plan promised to pay for Treatment A in 
Circumstance A, a beneficiary in Circumstance A being denied 
coverage of Treatment A could sue for the “benefits due to him 
under the terms of his plan.”28  It is ERISA’s statutory analog to a 
breach of contract claim. 
Several crucial limitations have been grafted onto this benefit-
denial remedy.  These limitations involve exhaustion, deference, 
damages, and restricted jury rights. 
Exhaustion.  Limitation one is that a beneficiary must “exhaust” the 
plan’s internal claims process before being permitted to seek judicial 
relief.29  Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted this 
requirement, it has spoken favorably of it,30 and the circuits have 
overwhelmingly imposed “exhaustion” as a precondition to suit.31  
Setting aside the policy wisdom of this limitation, ERISA by its 
terms imposes no such “exhaustion” requirement.  Instead, it speaks 
of plans being required to provide beneficiaries with an 
“opportunity” for “full and fair review” of a benefit denial by the plan 
                                                          
 24. Id. § 1102(a). 
 25. Id. § 1132.  
 26. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B). 
 27. See Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 433, 453 n.151 (2010) (describing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) as the 
“benefits” remedy). 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  The statute actually uses “his,” rather than 
gender-neutral language. 
 29. Id. § 1133(1)–(2) (setting forth ERISA’s internal claims procedure).  
Exhaustion—even without deference—is a modest form of litigation reform.  “In 
fact, all but a few plan participants fail to complete the arduous appeal process 
available to them even before this new, external level of review.”  Katherine T. 
Vukadin, Hope or Hype?:  Why the Affordable Care Act’s New External Review Rules for 
Denied ERISA Healthcare Claims Need More Reform, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2012). 
 30. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 258 (2008) 
(Roberts, J., concurring) (describing the administrative exhaustion requirement 
as a “safeguard[] for plan administrators” that is “recognized by almost all the 
Courts of Appeals”).   
 31. Id.; see also Wilczynski v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 93 F.3d 397, 401–02 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (noting Seventh Circuit precedent that courts may require exhaustion of 
administrative proceedings); Diaz v. United Agric. Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan, 50 
F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating a general rule that a claimant must exhaust 
internal claims procedures before bringing a lawsuit); Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 
F.3d 969, 974 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that claimant must exhaust administrative 
remedies prior to suing); Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 826 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (finding an exhaustion requirement). 
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fiduciary.32  As scholars have tirelessly but futilely pointed out, an 
opportunity is not a requirement.33 
Deference.  Limitation two is that plans possess the power to force 
courts to “defer” to the judgment of the internal reviewer.  In a case 
called Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,34 the Supreme Court held that 
courts should review benefit denial claims de novo unless the plan 
document confers interpretative discretion upon fiduciaries charged 
with administering the plan.35  In that case, courts must “defer” to the 
fiduciary’s determination, unless he has acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously.36  To capture Firestone deference, virtually all plans confer 
discretion on those who consider and review benefit claims.37 
Moreover, even if a beneficiary establishes that a fiduciary is 
conflicted, the fiduciary is still entitled to deference.  In such a case, a 
judge is simply asked to scrutinize more closely the fiduciary’s 
finding, with the scrutiny intensifying in proportion to the likelihood 
the conflict affected the decision.38  Moreover, deference does not 
evaporate if the fiduciary behaves arbitrarily and capriciously in 
resolving the benefit claim.  In that event, the court should merely 
vacate the fiduciary’s conclusion and remand it back to the fiduciary 
for a second bite at the apple.39  Only when a fiduciary’s behavior 
amounts to bad faith can a court conclusively resolve the matter.40 
Deference, like exhaustion, does not grace ERISA’s pages.41  It is a 
judicial gloss long attacked by scholars.42  ERISA contemplates that 
                                                          
 32. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2). 
 33. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Creating a Paternalistic Market for Legal Rules Affecting 
the Benefit Promise, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 657, 674–76 (arguing that, as both a textual and 
policy matter, it is unlikely that ERISA requires administrative exhaustion).  
 34. 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
 35. Id. at 115. 
 36. Id. at 109. 
 37. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law:  The Unum/Provident 
Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 
1324 (2007) (observing that “[p]lan drafters routinely seize upon Bruch’s invitation 
to instruct the courts to defer to plan decisionmaking”). 
 38. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117 (2008) (explaining that a 
conflict of interest “should prove more important . . . where circumstances suggest a 
higher likelihood that it affected the benefits decision”). 
 39. See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1651 (2010) (holding that district 
court erred in refusing “to defer to the Plan Administrator’s interpretation of the 
Plan on remand, simply because the Court of Appeals had found a previous related 
interpretation by the Administrator to be invalid”).  
 40. See id. at 1647.  A finding of bad faith does not create a bad faith cause of 
action under ERISA.  It simply means that the court can interpret the insurance 
contract on its own.   Precisely what the Court means by “bad faith” is not clear. 
 41. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109 (“ERISA does not set out the appropriate 
standard of review for actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benefit 
eligibility determinations.”). 
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the fiduciaries charged with deciding benefit claims may be 
employed, controlled, or otherwise influenced by the party obligated 
to pay on those claims.43  A rule of judicial deference to a likely-
conflicted decision maker makes little sense, and no sense at all in the 
context of a statute designed to protect the interests of beneficiaries.44 
Damages.  Limitation three relates to damages.  In 1985, in an 
opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court ruled that “extra-
contractual,” or consequential, damages are not recoverable.45   
Instead, the Court held that a beneficiary may only recover the value 
of the denied benefit.46  That is, if a wrongfully denied or delayed 
benefit led to death or permanent injury, consequential damages are 
not available.  Observers across the board, including scholars like 
Richard Epstein, have questioned the wisdom of this limitation.47  
That a party who suffers a legally cognizable injury has a right, in 
appropriate circumstances, to recover foreseeable damages arising 
from that injury is one of American law’s foundational principles.  If 
Congress chose to eliminate such a natural feature of civil relief, one 
would expect Congress’s choice to have been varnished with statutory 
ink.  No such limitation appears in ERISA’s text.48 
                                                          
 42. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 
207, 217–20 (criticizing deference); Langbein, supra note 37, at 1336–42 (same); 
Maher & Stris, supra note 27, at 471–73 (same). 
 43. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 1316, 1325, n.69 (explaining that “ERISA 
fiduciaries are commonly aligned with the employer” and noting that “[m]ost ERISA 
plan benefit denials are the work of conflicted decisionmakers”). 
 44. See Maher & Stris, supra note 27, at 472–73 (arguing that deferential review 
encourages self-serving benefit determinations and increases the complexity of 
promises).  Many states have attempted to limit the use of discretionary clauses, 
although whether those efforts will survive ERISA preemption is not settled.  See 
generally Radha A. Pathak, Discretionary Clause Bans & ERISA Preemption, 56 S.D. L. 
REV. 500 (2011) (analyzing discretionary clause bans). 
 45. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
 46. Id. at 144 (finding no “express authority for an award of extracontractual 
damages to a beneficiary”).   
 47. See Richard A. Epstein & Alan O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care:  Vicarious 
Liability, ERISA Preemption, and Class Actions, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 625, 642 (2001) 
(acknowledging that the argument in favor of consequential damages under ERISA 
“has considerable force and may in the end be convincing”); see also George Lee 
Flint, Jr., ERISA:  Extracontractual Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 611, 617–20 (1994). 
 48. Moreover, ERISA provides two other significant remedies to beneficiaries 
under § 1132(a)(2) and (a)(3).  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)–(3) (2012).  The 
§ 1132(a)(2) remedy is designed to police errant fiduciaries.  The § 1132(a)(3) 
remedy is a “catch-all” remedy sounding in equity.  Those remedies, while limited in 
other ways, are less restrictive than the “benefits” remedy.  However, the Supreme 
Court has held that, absent unusual circumstances, a beneficiary may only avail 
himself of the remedies set forth in § 1132(a)(2) and § 1132(a)(3) if the benefits 
remedy is not applicable.  See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996) 
(surmising that where Congress has provided adequate relief for a beneficiary’s 
injury, there will be no need for (a)(3) relief).  Numerous lower courts have 
explicitly held that the availability of the benefits remedy bars the use of other ERISA 
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Restricted jury rights.  Limitation four relates to jury trials.  In 
federal courts, ERISA benefit disputes are heard by a judge, not a 
jury.  The rationale, roughly, is that ERISA is a codified form of trust 
law.49  In the days of the divided bench, trust disputes were resolved 
by equity courts.50  Thus, so the reasoning goes, ERISA claims—
including simple disputes over coverage, which, in reality, resemble 
nothing more than contract claims—are “equitable” in nature and 
are thus heard by a judge.51  Scholars have criticized this 
reasoning.52  The Supreme Court has not considered the issue, but 
the circuit courts of appeals are in broad agreement.53  ERISA itself 
is silent on the question.54 
                                                          
remedies.  See, e.g., Korotynska v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 474 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 
2006) (“[Section] 1132(a)(3) authorizes some individualized claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty, but not where the plaintiff’s injury finds adequate relief in another 
part of ERISA’s statutory scheme.”); Ogden v. Blue Bell Creameries U.S.A., Inc., 348 
F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining “that an ERISA plaintiff who has an 
adequate remedy under Section 502(a)(1)(B) cannot alternatively plead and 
proceed under Section 502(a)(3)”); Short v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 961 F. Supp. 
261, 266 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (stating that because “§ 502(a)(1)(B) allows [the 
plaintiff] to recover any benefits he is due under the plan[,] . . . relief under 
§ 502(a)(3) is not appropriate”). 
ERISA suggests no such restriction.  None of the enumerated remedies condition 
their availability on whether another remedy is applicable, and no remedy by its 
terms bars use of another enumerated remedy.  See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1332 
(providing guidelines for the civil enforcement of ERISA).  Neither the fiduciary 
remedy nor the equitable remedy is, as of this writing, subject to exhaustion or 
deference.  Making the benefits remedy the dominant remedy is a judicial gloss, 
motivated, ironically enough, by a desire to protect the other judicial glosses of 
exhaustion, deference, and no consequential damages.  
 49. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA 
abounds with the language and terminology of trust law.”). 
 50. See Boone v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 163 F.2d 309, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1947) 
(recognizing the inherent power of a court of equity to preside over the 
administration of trusts). 
 51. See DeFelice v. Am. Int’l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 112 F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 
1997) (“[C]ases involving ERISA benefits are inherently equitable in nature, not 
contractual, and . . . no right to jury trial attaches to such claims.”). 
 52. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA:  Jury Trial Mandated for Benefit Claims 
Actions, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 361 (1992) (explaining and criticizing federal courts’ 
“trust” reasoning to deny jury trials in ERISA actions).  
 53. The circuit courts of appeal that have considered the issue have held that 
ERISA beneficiaries are not entitled to a jury trial.  Muller v. First Unum Life Ins. 
Co., 341 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Or. Fruit Prods. Co., 228 F.3d 991, 
997 (9th Cir. 2000); Hampers v. W.R. Grace & Co., 202 F.3d 44, 54 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 1998); Adams v. 
Cyprus AMAX Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1998); Mathews v. Sears 
Pension Plan, 144 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1998); Borst v. Chevron Corp., 36 F.3d 
1308, 1324 (5th Cir. 1994); Blake v. UnionMutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am., 906 
F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 
(3d Cir. 1989); Berry v. CIBA–GEIGY Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985); In 
re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1982).   
In contrast, for section 502(a)(1)(B) claims brought in state court, which ERISA 
permits, see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), state law on jury rights governs.  Most state courts 
award jury trials.  See, e.g., Shaw v. Atl. Coast Life Ins. Co., 470 S.E.2d 382, 386 (S.C. 
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ERISA as national litigation reform.  ERISA’s remedial system 
exemplifies the preference of many litigation reformers.  It is a (1) 
mandatory, (2) no-damages, (3) private scheme of dispute resolution, 
subject only to (4) modest agency regulation, (5) feeble judicial 
oversight, and (6) no juries.  Moreover, because of ERISA’s 
enormous preemptive reach,55 any state law that attempted to 
“supplement” this remedial scheme was held to be in conflict with 
ERISA’s purposes and thus preempted.56  The result:  not only did 
ERISA instantiate profound litigation reform, it made it national. 
The irony is that ERISA, at the time of its passage, was hailed as 
a landmark protective statute.57  One of its explicit purposes was to 
provide beneficiaries with “appropriate remedies, sanctions, and 
                                                          
Ct. App. 1996) (“The majority of state courts, prior to and subsequent to the 
enactment of ERISA, have viewed the plans as contractual, thus granting jury trials in 
benefits-due lawsuits.”).  The practical effect of this is limited because, even though a 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) action can be filed in either state or federal court, a defendant may 
remove the dispute to federal court on federal question grounds.  See, e.g., Clorox 
Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 779 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that “ERISA contains no express provision against removal” and supplies no 
other indication “that Congress intended to prevent removal of employee actions 
filed in state courts”).  
 54. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”:  The Supreme Court’s 
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1355 
(2003) (“ERISA’s procedure and remedy sections are riddled with major omissions 
that the courts have had to fill in, such as whether jury trial pertains, and what statute 
of limitations to use.”); see also Flint, supra note 52, at 399 (“ERISA contains no 
express provision granting a jury trial for benefits-due lawsuits . . . .”). 
 55. See infra note 67 (detailing the scope of ERISA’s preemption clause as 
defined by judge-made law); infra Part IV.A (explaining preemption and, in 
particular, conflict preemption). 
 56. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209, 221 (2004) (explaining that 
state law is preempted if it “duplicates, supplements, or supplants” any of the civil 
enforcement remedy provisions in section 502 of ERISA and holding that state-law 
created causes of action against HMOs were preempted); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990) (holding that wrongful termination cause of 
action was preempted); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) 
(holding that Mississippi law of bad faith denial of insurance benefits was 
preempted); Radha A. Pathak, Discretionary Clause Bans & ERISA Preemption, 56 S.D. 
L. REV. 500, 512–13 (2011) (concluding that discretionary clauses in state laws are 
likely not conflict preempted by the remedies provision of ERISA). 
 57. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 4639 (1973) (“The primary purpose of [ERISA] is 
the protection of individual pension rights . . . .”); 120 CONG. REC. at 29,935 (1974) 
(“[A] pension reform law is now a reality because of the hardship, deprivation and 
inequity suffered by American working people . . . .  The discipline of law will enable 
this and succeeding generations of workers to face their retirement period with 
greater confidence and greater security . . . .”); 120 CONG. REC. 29,933, 29,935 (1974) 
(referring to ERISA as a “pension ‘bill of rights’”); see also Larry J. Pittman, ERISA’s 
Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry:  An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating 
Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355, 358–60 (1994) (noting that the primary purpose of 
ERISA was to protect beneficiaries from administrative and funding abuses); Peter J. 
Wiedenbeck, ERISA’s Curious Coverage, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 311, 349 (1998) (“ERISA was 
enacted to inform and protect employees.”).  
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ready-access to the Federal courts.”58  Instead, it turned into one of 
the most effective pieces of federal litigation reform legislation 
ever passed. 
There is no tidy answer as to why this happened.  The text of the 
statute provides little justification; ERISA’s defining remedial features 
are judicial emendations.  What explains their creation?  Legal 
realism provides the most compelling explanation, one which not 
only provides a more satisfying explanation to the Supreme Court’s 
past behavior, but also sheds light on how the ACA might be 
interpreted.  I revisit this issue at more length in Part III.A.  First, I 
briefly discuss the differences between state insurance law and ERISA.  
The former, under ACA, will become more important than it has 
been in over thirty years.59 
B. State Law Remedy 
While state law varies, insured individuals seeking coverage under 
state insurance law possess more expansive remedies than under 
ERISA.60  Relative to ERISA, state law favors claimants by providing 
broader legal remedies, including:  multiple causes of action; 
interpretative doctrines favoring insureds; compensatory, usually 
consequential, and sometimes punitive, damages; and, jury rights.  
Nevertheless, it is not the litigious free-for-all that is sometimes 
suggested.61  Sensible limits exist, in some states more than others, 
though none go nearly as far as ERISA. 
Most states do not require that an insured exhaust any internal 
grievance procedures beyond that which is necessary to make clear 
that the insurer is actually denying coverage.62  Use of internal 
                                                          
 58. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). 
 59. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 20 tbl.3 (projecting that 25 
million people will receive insurance through individual markets by 2022). 
 60. The citations in this section are generally taken from cases that involve 
insurance generally, not just health insurance.  Prior to the ACA, the individual 
insurance markets that states regulated were sparsely populated.  Supra note 19.  For 
that reason, expression of remedial insurance principles was more likely to come up 
in cases involving matters other than health insurance. 
 61. See Donald T. Bogan, Saving State Law Bad-Faith Claims from Preemption, TRIAL, 
Apr. 2003, at 57, 57–58 (noting that under state law plaintiffs may pursue, for 
example, bad faith remedies not available under ERISA); Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum 
Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1160 (2006) 
(arguing that plaintiff-friendly states “exert a disproportionate negative influence 
over law,” particularly with respect to class actions). 
 62. As the Solicitor General has explained:  “state-law insurance claims . . . 
generally involve no required exhaustion of plan remedies.”  Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & 
Accident Ins. Co., 134 S. Ct. 604 (2013) (No. 12-729).  Absent some salient indication 
that the insurer is denying coverage, the insured would have no standing to sue. 
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procedures, if offered by the insurance company, is optional.63  
Accordingly, state law does not maroon insureds in a system where 
conflicted adjudicators play a central role in resolving claims.  Nor 
does the insurer benefit from favorable interpretative regimes.  
Contracts of insurance were the first contracts described as contracts 
of adhesion,64 and in many states the interpretation of insurance 
contracts is either de novo or contra proferentem (where the insurance 
policy is construed against the drafter).65 
Various causes of action are available to remediate coverage 
denials, as well as to recover consequential or even punitive damages, 
if the insurer improperly delays or refuses to pay on the policy.66  
Juries are available to most claimants.67  Numerous states authorize 
some form of consequential and punitive damages in certain 
circumstances, either via statute or under principles of their common 
law.68  Limits on potential misuses of state remedies like “bad faith” 
                                                          
 63. Id. 
 64. Indeed, “the first use of the term ‘contract of adhesion’ was in an article 
dealing with the formation of insurance contracts.”  Meier v. N.J. Life Ins. Co., 101 
N.J. 597, 612 n.10 (1986) (citing Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance 
Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919). 
 65. See 2 RCRA AND SUPERFUND:  A PRACTICE GUIDE § 16:11 (3d ed. 2004) 
(explaining that “unless the wording of the policies is actually drafted by the 
insured or the insured’s representative, most courts will apply the contra 
proferentem rule and, when faced with ambiguity, will adopt an interpretation of 
the policy that favors the insured”). 
 66. In early insurance cases, the hoary Hadley-Baxendale rule limiting available 
legal relief to foreseeable consequential damages was in some jurisdictions limited by 
another principle, one limiting the damages in a failure to pay cases to the value of 
the contract.  See, e.g., Bob G. Freemon, Jr., Reasonable and Foreseeable Damages for 
Breach of an Insurance Contract, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 108, 108 (1985) (discussing the 
origins and limits on consequential damages in insurance cases).  Such limits 
motivated insurers to behave aggressively.  Most states responded by recognizing 
causes of action that permitted the recovery of consequential and punitive damages, 
such as bad faith, as well as by enacting “penalty statutes to cover insurer abuses with 
respect to claims.”  Flint, supra note 47, at 658. 
 67. See Shaw v. Atl. Coast Life Ins. Co., 470 S.E.2d 382, 385 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) 
(concluding that most states view insurance disputes as contract disputes suitable for 
a jury).  Whether juries are “better” for plaintiffs than judges is a matter of some 
dispute.  See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare:  A Portrait of 
the Jury, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 731 (2006) (examining mixed empirical research on 
whether juries are friendlier to plaintiffs than judges).  Whatever the actual answer, 
litigation reformers routinely back measures that limit the jury.  See, e.g., Huber, supra 
note 5, at 319 (criticizing tort liability as determined by juries).  The mid-1980s wave 
of tort reform litigation imposed caps on non-economic damages to prevent 
“runaway” jury awards.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES, at vii (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default 
/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5549/report.pdf (“Although tort reform is a 
continuing issue, it gained prominence in the mid-1980s, when many states enacted 
reforms in response to a perceived problem in insurance costs.”). 
 68. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (2012) (25% penalty for bad faith refusal); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105(a) (2008) (25% penalty for bad faith refusal); Chavers v. 
Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 7 (Ala. 1981) (per curiam) (recognizing bad 
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exist as well.69  Damage caps nonspecific to insurance claims are also 
in effect in several states.70 
C. ERISA Realism 
Why ERISA diverged so significantly from state law on remedy is a 
puzzle.  Textual explanations fail because ERISA’s statutory language 
is at best scant with respect to the above-listed remedial limits 
imposed by the judiciary.  A legal realist account of judicial behavior 
is more convincing.  American legal realism71 contends that legal 
outcomes depend both on official legal materials, like statutes and 
precedents, as well as “nonlegal” forces, like policy preferences.72 
Few scholars today believe that judges discharge their will 
unconstrained by anything other than their own sense of discretion.  
Virtually all credible observers accept that statutory language, agency 
regulation, and precedent have some constraining power, although 
there is disagreement over the details.73  Many, including me, believe 
that Realist impulses (e.g., nonlegal motivations) will frequently 
overcome modest statutory or precedential hurdles.  Put another way:  
if there is some ambiguity in a statute, extra-statutory inclinations are 
likely to drive the resolution of disputes about the statute’s meaning.  
From that perspective, with respect to ERISA, three particular 
nonlegal concerns drove the interpretation of the statute:  (1) the 
cost and uncertainty of making health insurance promises; (2) the 
lack of a suitable insurance alternative to employment-provided 
insurance; and (3) general judicial hostility, from 1980 onward, to 
expansive remedy. 
                                                          
faith claim against insurer); Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93–94 
(Ct. App. 1970) (upholding damages award for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress arising from bad faith insurance conduct); Arnold v. Nat’l Cnty. Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (recognizing a “cause of action for breach 
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing” against insurers). 
 69. Douglas R. Richmond, The Two-Way Street of Insurance Good Faith:  Under 
Construction, But Not Yet Open, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 95, 143 (1996) (explaining that 
insurers have a variety of defenses to bad faith claims, such as comparative bad faith, 
recoupment, setoff, and breach of the policy’s cooperation clause). 
 70. See, e.g., Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901, 911 (Colo. 1993) 
(en banc) (holding noneconomic damage cap to be constitutional); Univ. of Miami 
v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 198 (Fla. 1993) (same); Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. 
Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1116 (Idaho 2000) (same). 
 71. See supra note 10 (discussing the author’s intending meaning of legal 
realism). 
 72. See Schauer, supra note 10, at 752–56 (detailing the various beliefs of 
American legal realists).  I sometimes use the term “extra-statutory” to mean 
essentially the same thing as “nonlegal.” 
 73. See supra note 10 (listing variants of legal realism). 
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Cost and uncertainty.  Insurance is costly and uncertain.  Cost is a 
function of the insurance policy’s expected payout.  The higher the 
cost of the service the insurance has to provide in connection with a 
loss event, the more costly the insurance policy will be to buy and 
perform.  As health care costs began to sharply rise in the 1980s and 
thereafter, commentators expressed a multitude of theories as to why 
costs were so high.74  There was little dispute that health care costs 
were rising; the dispute was why.  The breadth of a judicial remedy, 
irrespective of whether it is a primary driver of rising health care 
costs, increases the overall cost of making a health insurance promise.  
Moreover, to the extent a judicial remedy is “volatile”—that is, likely 
that two impartial adjudicators, on the same facts, will reach widely 
different liability or damages determinations—the effective cost of 
providing an insurance policy subject to this remedy increases for 
risk-averse defendants.75 
For judges aware of the problem of rising health costs and faced 
with multiplying disputes over coverage decisions, a natural 
temptation is to “trim” the remedy, so as to reduce the average cost 
and volatility of offering health insurance.76   The degree to which 
courts have acknowledged that concerns about cost influenced the 
selection and application of legal rules varies, but there is little doubt 
that cost plays a role.77  The only question about which reasonable 
minds might disagree is how large a role cost concerns played in 
driving the judiciary to fiercely cabin ERISA’s benefit denial remedy. 
                                                          
 74. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 
259 (1982) (noting an increase in medical costs attributable in part to scientific 
and educational advances that improved quality of care); Jonathan B. Baker, The 
Antitrust Analysis of Hospital Mergers and the Transformation of the Hospital Industry, 51 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 95 (1988) (attributing health care cost increases to the 
inefficiencies of “cost-based or charge-based reimbursement for health care”); Paul 
B. Ginsburg, Alternative Approaches to Health Care Cost Containment, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 
447, 448–52 (1990) (surveying the varying success of cost containment policies and 
the reasons for their lack of success); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care 
System and How To Fix It:  An Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
537, 547–49 (2006) (attributing increasing costs of health care to a variety of 
variables, such as improvements in technology and growing proportion of elderly); 
Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard:  Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 
535–36 (1968) (explaining why moral hazard in health insurance leads to upward 
price pressure). 
 75. See Maher & Stris, supra note 44, at 470 (arguing that volatility in benefit 
promises increases the cost of providing insurance). 
 76. See id. (suggesting that eliminating consequential damages could address 
concerns related to increasing cost).  
 77. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (voicing concern 
that the rule urged by the plaintiff would impose high insurance costs upon persons 
who regularly deal with and offer advice to ERISA plans and would discourage 
growth of private pension plans). 
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Lack of a suitable alternative.  A second reality regarding the 
availability of health insurance amplifies the weight of the cost 
concerns.  Because of the nature of insurance economics, health 
insurance options outside of group markets are often costly or 
unavailable.78  Individual insurance transactions are hamstrung by the 
problem of adverse selection, where the person seeking insurance 
could pose a greater payout risk than the insurer is able to ascertain 
and charge for.79  Group insurance is less risky for the insurer.  The 
larger the group, the more the insurance risk will approach the risk 
of insuring the entire community, and community risk is, generally 
speaking, ascertainable by insurers.80  Employment-based insurance, 
a form of group insurance, thus lessens the hurdles of adverse 
selection and provides important access to health insurance—access 
that an individual could not, on his own, obtain as inexpensively, or 
perhaps even at all.81 
ERISA does not require employers to offer health insurance to 
their employees.82  Thus, to the extent offering insurance becomes, in 
employers’ minds, too costly or too volatile, employers in the pre-
ACA world might stop offering it, leaving their employees with no 
realistic alternative.83  When assessing questions about the contour of 
the ERISA benefit denial remedy, judges would have been hard 
pressed to ignore the consequences of interpreting the remedy 
expansively.  If employers were deterred from offering insurance 
because of the cost and uncertainty associated with generous 
remedies—for example, runaway damage awards for pain and 
suffering—then quite literally many millions of Americans would 
have become unable to obtain health insurance. 
Judicial hostility.  Finally, since the election of Ronald Reagan in 
1980, the federal judiciary has been reluctant to afford expansive 
remedies to plaintiffs in a wide variety of contexts.84  As Professors 
                                                          
 78. See Peter Diamond, Organizing the Health Insurance Market, 60 ECONOMETRICA 
1233, 1236–37 (1992) (explaining that in individual markets, high risk individuals 
may be rejected or unable to obtain affordable coverage).   
 79. Id. 
 80. This assumes the group is one organized for some purpose other than to buy 
insurance; the group must be aggregated along some dimension that is orthogonal 
to risk.   
 81. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (explaining that health insurance 
outside of group markets is often costly or unavailable). 
 82. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 83. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 402 (2002) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (expressing concern that expanded remedies “could create a disincentive 
to the formation of employee health benefit plans”). 
 84. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 
343, 345–62 (identifying four important Supreme Court cases that advance a 
“constricted view of statutory interpretation and of the scope of judicial power to 
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Meltzer and Resnick have explained, judges skeptical of the utility of 
court access and broad remedies, and fearful of their abuse by 
opportunistic plaintiffs’ lawyers, have enjoyed rising reputations and 
influence since 1980.85  Several such judges sat on or are currently 
sitting on the Supreme Court.86 
It is important to distinguish the realist motivation of “hostility to 
remedy” from the other realist motivations discussed above.  A person 
could very easily be neutral on the general question of remedy and 
yet be inclined to interpret ERISA remedies narrowly for fear of cost 
and lack of an insurance alternative.  One would expect such a 
person to alter his or her judicial behavior upon alleviation of those 
concerns, rather than reading litigation reform into a statute.  In 
contrast, a judge with a natural skepticism regarding the utility of 
remedy will be more likely, if not eager, to trim remedies in any case 
where a statute does not prohibit him or her from doing so. 
The objective here is not to prove beyond cavil that extra-statutory 
influences drove ERISA interpretation; full treatments of that 
question, and constituent parts thereof, have been undertaken 
elsewhere.87  The point instead is to ask, if the extra-statutory 
                                                          
flesh out federal enactments in service of statutory and constitutional purposes”); 
Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies:  The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 
78 IND. L.J. 223, 256–58 (2003) (discussing how Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. 
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), represents a shift in understanding of federal 
remedial powers). 
 85. See Meltzer, supra note 84, at 345–62; Resnik, supra note 84, at 256–58; see also 
infra note 86 and accompanying text (describing the previous and current makeup 
of the Supreme Court and its attitude toward broad court remedies). 
 86. Professor Andrew Siegel has argued that a defining feature of the Rehnquist 
Court (1986–2005) was its hostility “towards the institution of litigation and its 
concomitant skepticism as to the ability of litigation to function as a mechanism for 
organizing social relations and collectively administering justice.”  Andrew M. Siegel, 
The Court Against the Courts:  Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the 
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2006).  The Roberts Court 
(2005–present) has offered no indication it feels differently.  See Editorial, supra note 
3.  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito are widely 
believed to be skeptical of broad court remedies.  See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 
1472–73 (2013) (observing a shift of conservative Justices in favor of business 
interests following the appointment of Roberts and Alito and noting that “the 
Roberts Court is much friendlier to business than either the Burger or Rehnquist 
Courts, which preceded it, were”).  Past Justices Burger and O’Connor criticized the 
perils of expansive remedy.  See, e.g., Richard de Uriarte, Good Lawyer/Bad Lawyer:  
O’Conner’s Criticism of Contingency Fees Provokes Debate, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 2001 at 
V.1 (describing Justice O’Connor’s criticism of “out-of-control class action lawsuits 
and outrageous contingency fees” as being earlier expressed by Justice Burger). 
 87. See, e.g., Maher, supra note 33, at 659 (identifying concerns about promise 
costs as having influenced the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ERISA); Dana M. 
Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield:  The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 425–26 (2000) (describing and criticizing the settlor 
doctrine); Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy:  Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of 
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concerns listed above played a meaningful role in converting ERISA 
from a protective statute into a vehicle for litigation reform, to what 
degree will the ACA be molded by those same influences?  Obviously 
that answer depends upon (1) the degree to which the ACA is 
flexible enough to yield to moderately realist interpretative behavior, 
and (2) the power the three nonlegal forces that affected ERISA 
exert on today’s judges.  I consider both questions in Part III.  In Part 
II, to set the table, I offer a conceptual summary of the remedial 
concepts in the ACA. 
II. REMEDIAL CONCEPTS IN THE ACA 
What the ACA says about remedy is short—a single section of 
code—but it presents considerable complexity.88  To understand the 
effect that section has on remedy requires familiarity with multiple 
sources of authority outside the ACA.89  Before plunging into those 
intricacies, I provide a conceptual sketch of the legislation’s three 
tracks of remedy. 
Only one section of the ACA directly considers remedy.90  It 
contemplates three important remedial concepts:  internal review,91 
external review,92 and judicial review.  Section 2719 directly speaks to the 
first two, and indirectly speaks to the third.  I consider each below.93 
A. Internal Review 
The ACA contemplates an “internal claims appeal process”, which I 
refer to as “internal review,” for coverage claims by insureds.94  Stated 
simply, internal review is a procedure for processing beneficiaries’ 
claims and appeals that is administered by the insurer or its 
                                                          
ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 133 (2009) (arguing that the Court has prioritized cost 
reduction over protecting beneficiaries, contrary to congressional wishes). 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19 (2012). 
 89. To wit:  the ACA explicitly refers to, and relies on (1) state law; (2) complex 
federal regulations old and new; (3) the discretion of the Departments of Labor, 
Treasury, and Health and Human Services; and (4) ERISA.  Perhaps more 
importantly, making sense of the ACA remedy provision requires understanding the 
federal-state division of authority prior to its passage, a power allocation defined 
almost entirely by ERISA preemption doctrine. 
 90. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19. 
 91. Id. § 300gg-19(a)(1)(A). 
 92. Id. § 300gg-19(a)(1)(B). 
 93. Section 2719, standing alone, does not resolve how the three interact.  See 
infra Part II.D (discussing the ACA’s lack of guidance regarding how the remedial 
tracks should interact and suggesting that this gap may create room for litigation 
reform arguments).  
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(1)(A). 
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designee.95  The ACA and its implementing regulations require that 
all insurers offer internal review.96 
Internal review can serve desirable ends.  A genuine internal 
process requires that the handling of a benefit claim involve more 
than an unvarnished “yes” or “no.”  Some procedure is specified, in 
writing and ex ante.97  Adherence thereto is thought to encourage 
faithful and fair evaluation by the insurer, and impress that 
perception of fairness upon the claimant.98 
Few contend that internal processes alone will ensure fair results 
every time.  Conversely, few dispute that for some number of 
claims, internal review will produce the correct outcome; whether 
that number is large or small depends largely on one’s priors.  
Given the reduced cost of internal review compared to litigation,99 
one would expect there to be a sincere appetite by both insurers 
and claimants for fair internal review processes.100  On the other 
hand, if internal processes are not fair (relative to judicial review), 
then the disadvantaged party will likely prefer judicial review, even 
if it is more costly. 
Recall that internal review is part of ERISA’s remedial scheme.101  
Some claimant advocates have complained that internal review under 
ERISA was not fair.102  Of the many opinions that were offered 
                                                          
 95. In addition to “internal review,” I also occasionally use the terms “internal 
process,” or “internal procedures.”  All terms encompass both the initial claim and 
any subsequent internal appeal.  Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(b) (2013) (setting forth 
the baseline federal regulation, referred to explicitly in the ACA, as governing “the 
filing of benefit claims, notification of benefit determinations, and appeal of adverse 
benefit determinations” (emphasis added)). 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a); see also infra note 148 (describing the applicable 
standards set forth in the implementing regulations regarding internal review).  But 
see infra note 127 (identifying types of insurance beyond the scope of this Article). 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(2); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (describing the claims 
procedure for beneficiaries and participants to recover employee benefits).   
 98. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-443, at 1005 (2010) (describing the fair “grievance 
and appeals mechanisms” that the ACA intends to provide).  
 99. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (explaining why internal review is 
much cheaper than litigation). 
 100. Litigation is costly.  But it is costly for everybody, because everybody has to 
pay lawyers and devote resources to it, in one way or another.  To the extent 
litigation confers a substantive advantage on one party over another, that party will 
prefer litigation.  To the extent however, that litigation confers no substantive 
advantage, then both plaintiffs and defendants will prefer less costly dispute 
resolution alternatives. 
 101. See supra Part I.A (explaining that ERISA requires that all insurers provide an 
internal review process to adjudicate employee benefits claims). 
 102. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 1340 (arguing that deferential judicial review 
undermines the fairness of internal proceedings); Maher, supra note 33, at 673–76 
(observing that, among other things, administrator bias results in unfair 
administration of claims).  One critic compared internal review under ERISA to a 
“kangaroo court.”  Joseph F. Cunningham, ERISA:  Some Thoughts on Unfulfilled 
Promises, 49 ARK. L. REV. 83, 90 (1996). 
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criticizing internal review,103 perhaps the primary criticism was that 
the administrators charged with conducting ERISA’s internal reviews 
were often directly or indirectly beholden to the party who must pay 
on successful claims.104  Such actual or potential conflict might 
imperil fair review.  Other criticisms were that internal review 
procedures often limited claimant ability to fully present their side or 
were difficult to understand.105 
The ACA directly responds to those concerns and attempts to make 
internal review fairer.106  Indeed, the current internal review 
regulations for self-insured and group health plans include all the 
procedural protections the federal government previously required 
of ERISA plans, as well as a handful of new requirements 
promulgated in connection with the passage of the ACA.107  With 
respect to individual insurance policies, the regulations regarding 
internal review are even more stringent.108 
B. External Review 
External review is review done by a competent party unaffiliated 
with either the insurer or the claimant, but who wields some 
                                                          
 103. See, e.g., supra note 102 (describing commentators’ criticisms of the internal 
review process).   
 104. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction:  
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1126 (1988) (explaining that ERISA 
“leaves the plan sponsor to pick the fiduciary and, if the sponsor pleases, to do it 
from the ranks of management” and that “[s]ponsors routinely exercise this 
authority”).  More than two decades later, the problem remains.  John Bronsteen, 
Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in 
the United States, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2297, 2311–15 (2008) (explaining how conflict 
manifests itself across various payor-administrator relationships). 
 105. See Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA 
Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727, 741 (2004) (noting that under ERISA, 
there is no right to issue subpoenas and “rarely is there an opportunity to present 
testimonial evidence and elicit cross-examination during the claim process”). 
 106. See infra notes 107–08 and accompanying text (describing the stringent 
regulations governing internal review that aim to make the process fairer for claimants). 
 107. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19 (2012); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(a)–(b) 
(2013) (promulgating regulations for internal processes of self-insured and group-
insured plans).  “With respect to internal claims and appeals processes for group 
health plans and health insurance issuers offering group health insurance 
coverage . . . section 2719 provides that plans and issuers must” abide by regulations 
promulgated by Department of Labor.  Group Health Plans Rules Relating to 
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,209 (June 
24, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 117).  
 108. Individual insurers must satisfy regulations promulgated by the relevant State 
and the Department of Health and Human Safety.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
19(a)(2)(B); 45 C.F.R. § 147.136(a)–(b).  Individual insurers must comply with 
several “additional requirements for internal claims and appeals processes” relating 
to appeals and notice record-keeping.  76 Fed. Reg. at 37,209, n.3 (discussing 
additional internal review requirements for insurers offering individual insurance). 
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expertise helpful in resolving the dispute.109  In theory, external 
review is a cost-effective approach free of the potential conflict that 
naturally menaces internal review.110  It presents, in some respects, a 
middle ground between internal review and judicial review. 
The ACA envisions and provides that external review will be 
available to all insured persons, whether they receive insurance from 
a self-insured plan, a group-insured plan, or have individual 
coverage.111  The external review must be done by Independent 
Review Organizations, who are to be randomly assigned to disputes 
by regulatory officials, and who may not be otherwise conflicted.112  
The cost of the external review is to be borne by the insurer, with no 
more than a modest fee chargeable to the insured.113 
External review is widely perceived as more attractive to claimants 
than internal review, and the ACA’s embrace of external review is 
commendable.  External review is cheaper than litigation,114 and the 
structural risk of bias is much less than with internal review.115  On 
the other hand, although external review resolves coverage disputes, 
it cannot grant damages.  Moreover, the specter of regulatory capture 
exists where officials in a facially neutral government or government-
sponsored body subtly favor the regulated industry over the protected 
                                                          
 109. See infra note 112 and accompanying text (describing the qualifications for 
Independent Reviewers conducting external review). 
 110. Bronsteen, Maher & Stris, supra note 104, at 2324 (observing that impartial, 
third-party administrative review is a low-cost alternative to litigation that combats 
opportunistic insurer behavior). 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b) (mandating that group health plans and insurance 
issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage implement an 
external review process).  
 112. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(vii)–(ix).  The Independent Review 
Organization (IRO) specifics for self-insured plans are slightly different, but can 
largely be ignored for the purposes of this Article.  See Group Health Plans and 
Health Insurance Issuers:  Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and 
External Review Processes, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,210–11 (June 24, 2011) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (explaining the IRO process for self-insured plans).  I 
do pause to note, however, that as the regulations currently read, the IRO process for 
self-insured plans apparently contemplates random assignment from a list of external 
reviewers the employer has contracted with (which must be no less than three), see 
infra note 166, whereas state external review processes contemplate random 
assignment of external reviewers from a list compiled by the state.  29 C.F.R. 
§ 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(vii).  The former may represent an avenue for manipulation 
of the external review process.  
 113. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(iv). 
 114. See Bronsteen, Maher & Stris, supra note 104, at 2324 (noting that litigation is 
nothing more than a very expensive, very time-consuming process, whereas external 
review is significantly more attractive because it is expedient and inexpensive).  
 115. See id. at 2324–26 (explaining that external review significantly diminishes 
agency risk because the agent’s discretion for opportunistic behavior is 
circumscribed by the determinations of an impartial reviewer). 
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consumer.  Just the same, one would expect there to be a significant 
appetite by claimants for an external review option. 
C. Judicial Review 
Judicial review is what it sounds like:  litigation, where a federal or 
state court entertains an insured’s denied-coverage claim.116  The 
central component of judicial review is a cause of action, i.e., a legal 
right to relief that arises from some applicable body of substantive law 
given certain conditions.  Without a cause of action—the core of 
traditional remedy—there is nothing for a court to review. 
Importantly, the ACA does not provide a cause of action to remedy 
a coverage denial.117  Instead, a claimant has the right to bring suit 
under whatever law, pre-ACA, governed the insurance policy his 
claim arises under.118  Figuring that out, unfortunately, necessitates 
an understanding of ERISA preemption, because the two bodies of 
law potentially applicable to a coverage denial prior to the ACA’s 
enactment were ERISA and state law.119 
                                                          
 116. By judicial review, I stress that I simply mean litigation; not that a judge 
(rather than a jury) will decide the case.  Even when a jury decides, the judge still 
presides; hence, there is judicial review. 
 117. The ACA does not provide an explicit cause of action for coverage disputes.  
Nor does it seem at all likely that it creates an implied right of action for coverage 
denials, and I therefore assume it does not throughout.  See generally Cort v. Ash, 422 
U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (setting forth a four-part test to determine whether a statute 
impliedly creates a cause of action consisting of an analysis of the protected class, 
legislative intent, underlying statutory purpose, and traditional state law).  The 
Supreme Court has made clear that if a federal statute does not explicitly provide a 
cause of action, the strong presumption is that no private cause of action should be 
implied.  See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 
175 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (remarking that the conservative justices are 
hostile toward implied causes of action); ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER MAY, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE:  CASES AND PROBLEMS, 310 (4th ed. 2012) (“Courts have tended to apply 
[the Cort v. Ash] factors with increasing stringency in recent years, reflecting a 
judicial reluctance to imply a private right of action where Congress has failed to 
provide one.”). 
Indeed, with respect to certain issues other than coverage disputes, the Government 
Accountabilty Office (GAO) has already opined that the ACA does not create implied 
causes of action.  “Congress directed GAO to consider whether . . . any guideline or other 
standards under the 14 PPACA quality enhancement provisions identified in section 3512 
of the law would result in a ‘new cause of action or claim.’”  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, B-322525, CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT 1 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/B-322525#mt=e-report.  
The GAO answered negatively.  Id.; see also 156 CONG. REC. H1,857 (daily ed. March 
21, 2010) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (rejecting the notion that bills that would 
become the ACA “may be interpreted or construed as creating a new cause of action 
or claim or would modify or impair existing state medical malpractice laws”).  
 118. I consider the possibility that the ACA “extinguishes” the pre-existing right of 
insured persons to bring a cause of action for coverage denial below.  See infra Part 
III.B.3.  It does not.  The state law analysis applies with equal force to ERISA. 
 119. Put differently, with respect to the available cause of action for wrongful 
denial of coverage (and the damages recoverable), the ACA is a “pass-through” 
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ERISA explicitly preempts all state laws that “relate to” employee 
benefit plans.120  The broadness of that preemptive grant is lessened 
by ERISA’s “savings clause,” which saves state insurance laws from 
preemption.121  Nonetheless, the power of a saved insurance law to 
regulate employment-based insurance arrangements is limited in two 
important ways. 
The first limit on saved state insurance laws is a provision in ERISA 
called the “deemer” clause.122  ERISA bars states from directly regulating 
employment benefit plans by the expedient of deeming them to be 
insurers subject to saved insurance law.123  A state may, however, regulate 
an insurance company that provides a group policy to a benefit plan.  
Thus if Company Benefit Plan A engages Insurance Company B to issue 
group health coverage for company employees, a state can regulate 
Insurance Company B by way of “saved” insurance laws.124 
The second limit on saved insurance laws is conflict preemption.  If 
a state law—even a saved one—conflicts with ERISA’s purpose, it will 
be preempted.125  The Supreme Court has not been clear on the 
complete set of saved state laws that are conflict-preempted, but it has 
held that state laws providing additional causes of action or damages 
beyond those provided by ERISA are conflict-preempted.126 
The upshot is that the unusual mechanics of ERISA preemption 
mean that the cause of action and damages that an insured is entitled 
to depends on the nature of the insurance arrangement he is party 
                                                          
statute that relies on the previously applicable body of substantive law.  See Brendan 
S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1773 (2011) (“The 
ACA uses federal power to create a legal meta-structure in which individuals can 
plausibly ‘opt-in’ to either federal (specifically ERISA) or state law governing their 
health bargains.”). 
 120. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (providing that ERISA “shall supersede any 
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan”). 
 121. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). 
 122. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
 123. Id. 
 124. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 64 (1990) (“Our interpretation of the 
deemer clause makes clear that if a plan is insured, a State may regulate it indirectly 
through regulation of its insurer and its insurer's insurance contracts; if the plan is 
uninsured, the State may not regulate it.”). 
 125. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1979–85 (2011) 
(notwithstanding the savings clause preserving certain state laws from express 
preemption, state law might still be preempted if it conflicted with federal law); 
Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002) (explaining even 
saved laws would fall to ERISA conflict preemption); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 
481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) (holding that ERISA was intended to be the exclusive civil 
enforcement vehicle for ERISA-plan participants and state cause of action claims 
are therefore preempted). 
 126. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 55 (analogizing the Labor Management Relations 
Act’s preemption of state law causes of action to the preemptive scope of ERISA). 
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to.  The three pertinent types are (1) self-insured plans, (2) group-
insured plans, and (3) individual insurance.127 
Self-insured plans (employer-based).  A so-called “self-insured plan” is 
where the employer directly pays for employees’ incurred health care 
costs.128  In that instance, because of the deemer clause,129 the plan is 
entirely regulated by ERISA, including with respect to the cause of 
action available in the event of a coverage denial.130 
Group-insured plans (employer-based).  A group-insured plan is my 
functional term131 for a group insurance policy purchased by an 
employee benefit plan for its employees.  In that instance, because of 
conflict preemption, ERISA supplies the cause of action available for 
a coverage denial.132 
Individual insurance (not employer-based).  Individual insurance—
which is when an individual purchases a policy on her own—is 
governed by state law and subject to state law causes of action for 
coverage denials.133 
D. Remedial Interaction and Litigation Reform 
In a simple world, a legislature that contemplated three tracks of 
review—internal, external, and judicial review—would specify how 
these options were to interact.  Alternatively, in the absence of its own 
                                                          
 127. These three categories describe the overwhelming majority of arrangements 
by which the non-elderly and non-poor receive insurance:  through a traditional 
private employer or via the individual market.  Special cases, such as church plans or 
multiple-employer welfare plans, are not here considered.  “Grandfathered” plans—
which in some ways operate under the pre-ACA regime—are also not considered, 
because it seems likely that few plans will retain “grandfathered” status.  Elizabeth 
Weeks Leonard, Can You Really Keep Your Health Plan?  The Limits of Grandfathering 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 36 J. CORP. L. 753, 756 (2011).   
 128. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 54 (1990) (stating that a self-insured 
plan is where an employer satisfies its obligations to its participants without 
purchasing an insurance policy from any insurance company).  
 129. The deemer clause prevents a self-insured employer from being deemed an 
insurance provider.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2012); see supra notes 137–40 
(explaining the effect of the deemer clause). 
 130. See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text (explaining ERISA preemption).   
 131. Nomenclature for group health plans can get quite confusing.  A self-insured 
benefit plan and a benefit plan that obtains group coverage are both, conceptually, 
“group health plans.”  But because self-insured plans have a special regulatory status 
under ERISA and ACA, one must be careful to distinguish between a self-insured 
group plan and a group plan that buys group coverage for its employees from an 
insurance company.  To easily distinguish those two situations, I call the latter 
arrangement a “group-insured plan.”  Throughout, I use that convention and point 
out whether the statutes or regulations use different terminology that might confuse 
the reader.  See infra note 181 (discussing formal nonmenclature of the ACA). 
 132. See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text (explaining the relationship 
between causes of action and ERISA preemption). 
 133. ERISA governs employee benefit plans.  Individual insurance purchases are 
outside the scope of its coverage. 
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resolution of the matter, the enacting legislature would specify which 
regulator was to decide the issue.  Although the ACA suggests 
answers, it falls short of lapidary precision.  That feature of the 
legislation provides various footholds for litigation reform battles to 
be fought. 
To see why, assume for the sake of argument that background law 
permits only one remedial option in connection with an insurance 
denial:  litigation.  If another remedial option is added, such as 
internal review, whether that addition qualifies as litigation reform 
depends on the terms of the internal review.  If the internal review is 
fair and optional, it does not qualify as litigation reform,134 because it 
did nothing to reduce a claimant’s ability to obtain traditional relief.  
If, however, the internal review is bound up with a rule that limits the 
claimant’s ability to seek judicial review or the court’s ability to conduct 
a full and fair review, then it qualifies as litigation reform.  So it goes 
with any rule that subordinates a strong remedy to a weaker one. 
The ACA is susceptible to arguments that non-judicial remedies 
trump judicial ones.  Whether these arguments have merit is another 
question, but, as they were with respect to ERISA, they will be made.  
Moreover, because the ACA does not in all instances clearly specify 
who decides remedy questions, litigation reform efforts will be 
directed at regulators perceived as welcoming.  These efforts will 
come packaged in an analysis that insists such regulator was the 
precise authority the ACA envisioned to address itself to that task. 
III. ACA LITIGATION REFORM BATTLES:  REALISM AND SPECIFICS 
This Part accomplishes three things:  first, it considers the degree 
to which the extra-statutory influences that molded ERISA are still 
present; second, it analyzes the ACA and its implementing 
regulations at a granular level, with the aim of highlighting, for each 
type of insurance, specific litigation reform battles likely to consume 
judicial time; third, it readies the stage for a broader appraisal in Part 
IV.  Part IV examines “themes” one can expect litigation reformers 
and their opponents to sound in furtherance of the particular battles 
here predicted or in connection with others that the fog of regulatory 
settling make difficult to predict. 
                                                          
 134. As I mentioned at the beginning of the Article, litigation reform could 
technically mean reform in either direction, i.e., reform that helped defendants or 
plaintiffs.  In reality, it means reforms designed to aid defendants.  See supra note 1. 
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A. Realist Influences Reconsidered 
In Part I.C., I described three non-legal influences that drove 
judicial interpretation of ERISA:  (1) concerns over the high cost of 
health care, (2) worry about the lack of a suitable alternative to 
employment-based health insurance, and (3) a profound skepticism 
toward the utility of remedy in general.  To what extent do any of 
these constitute meaningful forces today? 
Insurance alternatives reconsidered.  The concern that the ACA 
ameliorates most is fear over a lack of alternatives to employment-
based insurance.  Prior to enactment of the ACA, if an employer 
chose not to offer insurance, the result would be that a significant 
number of its employees would be unable to obtain affordable 
insurance elsewhere.135  Moreover, employers are not in the business 
of insurance; an employer’s core competence relates to the product 
or service that the business sells to its customers.  The farther away a 
particular task is from a business’s core competency, the less likely 
the business will be willing to perform that function, to the extent it 
has a choice to do otherwise.  Thus, even slightly volatile or costly 
rules of remedy might deter employers from offering insurance, and 
concomitantly swell the ranks of the uninsured.  The ACA changes 
this calculus by penalizing large employers that fail to offer 
insurance136 and by opening up the individual market to everyone.137  
There should be less of a genuine concern that more protective rules 
of remedy will result in individuals being uninsured.138 
                                                          
 135. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (noting outside of group insurance 
coverage, insurance is very expensive and out of reach for many individuals). 
 136. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)(1) (2012) (stating that large employers will face a 
tax penalty if they do not offer employee health insurance). 
 137. See id. § 5000A (mandating that individuals maintain minimum essential 
health insurance); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (prohibiting discrimination against 
individuals based on pre-existing health conditions); 42 U.S.C. § 18001 
(providing for immediate access to health coverage for uninsured individuals 
with pre-existing conditions).  
 138. The concern that rules of remedy more expansive than those offered by 
ERISA will drive insurance companies (as distinct from employers) from the market 
remains.  Unlike employers, insurance companies are in the business of insurance.  
Accordingly, that rules of remedy (within reason) will meaningfully discourage 
insurance companies from offering health insurance is a concern that applies with 
less force against insurers than employers.  Insurers will object, predictably and 
perhaps understandably, but there is comparatively less of a chance that health 
insurance companies will en masse leave the business absent the protections of, say, 
judicial deference and a complete bar on consequential damages.  Although 
insurance company flight is less of a risk than employer flight, some sitting judges 
may, nonetheless, believe insurance company flight is a strong and undesirable 
possibility.  Cf. George Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 
YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (1987) (mentioning one early 1980s theory that rising insurance 
premiums were attributable in part to the expansion of corporate liability, causing, 
among other things, insurers to leave markets).  
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Judicial hostility reconsidered.  Judicial hostility to remedy remains,139 
although perhaps it is subsiding as more appointees of Democratic 
presidents take the bench, gain influence among their peers, and 
ascend to federal appellate courts.140  For example, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, long unfavorable to plaintiffs, has in 
recent years seen its composition change, and is perceived as more 
neutral than in years past.141  The point should not be overstated.  
The collective federal appellate bench is not teeming with judicial 
friends of the wronged.  And most importantly, the Supreme Court 
remains skeptical of the attractiveness of judicial resolutions, in 
ERISA and elsewhere.142  The high court exerts more gravity on the 
question of remedy than any other body. 
Health care costs reconsidered.  Of greatest concern is that the rising 
cost of health care remains unsolved.  Although there have been 
some favorable reports of a slowing of the increase in health care 
costs,143 the ACA failed to deal with a central cost problem associated 
with the provision of medical care, namely that medical care is 
provided through insurance, and health insurance promises hinge 
upon “medical necessity” with no limitation as to the marginal cost of 
                                                          
 139. See supra notes 85–86 (describing judicial hostility toward litigation and 
skepticism toward broad court remedies).   
 140. See infra note 141 and accompanying text (noting the rise of Obama 
appointees in the federal courts). 
 141. I base this observation on a series of personal conversations with private and 
government lawyers who practice in the Fourth Circuit.  That President Obama has 
appointed six judges to that circuit court of appeals is also, of course, relevant to changing 
perceptions.  See Obama Judicial Confirmation Statistics, JUDICIALNOMINATION.ORG, 
http://judicialnominations.org/statistics (last visited January 12, 2014) (listing President 
Obama’s six Fourth Circuit nominations made during his presidency to date).  
 142. See supra note 4 (noting the significant decisions by the Roberts Court that 
have limited a plaintiff’s ability to bring and win cases); see also Adam Liptak, 
Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2013), http://www.ny 
times.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-this-supreme-
court.html?pagewanted=all (citing Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1449 (2013), 
when describing the Roberts Court as limiting plaintiff rights in furtherance of a pro-
business agenda). 
 143. See, e.g., Anne B. Martin, et al.,  National Health Spending in 2012:  Rate of 
Health Spending Growth Remained Low for the Fourth Consecutive Year, 33 HEALTH AFF., 
no. 1, 2014 at, 67 (summarizing the results of a study conducted by the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) showing an increase of only 3.7% in health 
care expenditures, the fourth consecutive year of low growth); Jeanne Lambrew, New 
Report Shows 2012 Continued Trend of Slow Growth in Health Care Spending, WHITE HOUSE 
BLOG (Jan. 6, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/01/06/new-
report-shows-2012-continued-trend-slow-growth-health-care-spending (reporting on 
the CMS study, noting that 2009–2012 saw the slowest growth in health care 
expenditures since the 1960s); see also COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, EXECUTIVE 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COST GROWTH & THE ROLE OF THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACt 1 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default 
/files/docs/healthcostreport_final_noembargo_v2.pdf (concluding that “real per 
capital health care spending has grown at . . . the lowest rate on record”). 
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the necessary treatment.144  Until that matter is decisively addressed, 
the economic pressure on health care costs will remain strong.145  
The consequence will be that fears of cost will be lurking in the 
minds of judges everywhere, supplying a strong temptation to trim 
health insurance remedies to save pennies even as the legislature has 
dodged the question of pounds.146 
A fair presumption is that the foregoing extra-statutory concerns—
diminished relative to ERISA, but not weakened so much as to fade 
into insignificance—will influence judicial interpretation of the ACA, 
both with respect to the content of the law itself and the degree to 
which judges will be willing to interpret it to prevent states from 
pursuing policies that thwart or undo litigation reform.  One cannot 
exactly weigh the strength of these extra-statutory forces, nor predict 
precisely how they will guide decisional law interpreting the ACA.  
But it would be unwise to forget them when considering the specific 
and thematic analysis that follows in Part III.B and C. 
B. Litigation Reform Specifics 
As explained above, for regulatory purposes, the three relevant 
types of insurance arrangement are self-insured plans, group-
insured plans, and individual insurance policies.147  In this Part, I 
explain how regulatory power regarding remedy is allocated with 
respect to each type of insurance arrangement and suggest likely 
battles over rule content. 
                                                          
 144. See Maher & Stris, supra note 44, at 462 (noting that there is upward cost 
pressure on the health insurance promise and uncertainty associate with that 
promise because it does not explicitly include a marginal cost limitation and often 
results in promisees being denied claims for medical care). 
 145. See id. at 462–63 (explaining that the lack of a marginal cost limitation results 
in “relentless upward cost pressure” because patients, doctors, and entrepreneurs are 
incentivized to make decisions “without regard for cost-adjusted utility”); cf. Pauly, 
supra note 74, at 535–36 (explaining how moral hazard drives up price of health 
care); Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2009) 
(Magazine) (explaining how marginal value of treatments must be considered to 
arrest price increases).  Two possibilities for bending the medical cost curve 
downward are to incorporate marginal limits implicitly (through vast government 
provision of health care), or explicitly, through incorporation of cost effectiveness 
thresholds in private contracts of insurance.  Both had and have vigorous critics.  
The ACA does neither. 
 146. Limiting remedies will not meaningfully arrest the growth in health care 
costs, any more than sturdy buckets could have “bail[ed] out the Titanic.”  Maher & 
Stris, supra note 44, at 464 n.147. 
 147. “Group-insured plans” is my term for plans using group insurance.  See supra 
Part II.C.  The statute and the regulations distinguish between the plan and the 
insurer, but not in ways that are important except in specific circumstances. 
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1. Self-insured plans 
Self-insured plans remain exclusively subject to federal control.  
Internal review for self-insured plans must comply with requirements 
set out in the ACA itself and implementing regulations promulgated 
by the Department of Labor.148  External review must comply with the 
external review process promulgated by Labor and Treasury.149  The 
cause of action for coverage claims against self-insured plans under 
judicial review is provided by ERISA.150 
Observation one.  For self-insured plans, the ACA regulations and 
technical releases apparently require an exhaustion of internal review 
processes before a claimant is eligible for external review, a 
convention which tracks ERISA.151  However, the ACA clearly 
modifies the application of deference.  External reviewers must 
“review the claim de novo and not be bound by any decisions or 
conclusions reached during the health insurance issuer’s internal 
claims and appeals process.”152  This is significant because it means 
                                                          
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(2) (2012) provides that “a group health plan and a 
health insurance issuer offering group health coverage shall provide an internal 
claims and appeals process that initially incorporates the claims and appeals 
procedures . . . set forth at section 2560.503-1 of title 29, Code of Federal 
Regulations, as published on November 21, 2000 . . . and shall update such process 
in accordance with any standards established by the Secretary of Labor.”  The CFR 
reference in the ACA refers to the regulations that the Department of Labor 
formerly promulgated for self-insured plans under ERISA.  The updated regulations 
issued pursuant to the ACA more stringently regulate internal review procedures.  
For example, they more carefully regulate permissible conflicts of interest than prior 
regulations.  Insurers “must ensure . . . [the] independence and impartiality of the 
persons involved in making the decision.”  29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(D) 
(2013) (emphasis added).  “[D]ecisions regarding hiring, compensation, 
termination, promotion, or other similar matters with respect to any [person making 
a coverage determination] must not be made based upon the likelihood that the 
individual will support the denial of benefits.”  Id.  
 149. See Group Health Plans Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and 
External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,210–11 (June 24, 2011) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 117) (“In the case of self-insured plans subject to ERISA and/or the Code, 
a Federal external review process supervised by DOL and Treasury applies.”); see also 
29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(d) (setting forth DOL requirements for federally 
regulated external review process).  The preamble to the regulations provides that 
the DOL “would issue additional guidance on the federal external review process.” 
DEP’T OF LABOR, TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, INTERIM PROCEDURES FOR FEDERAL 
EXTERNAL REVIEW RELATING TO INTERNAL CLAIMS AND APPEALS AND EXTERNAL REVIEW 
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 2 (2010) [hereinafter 
TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01], available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ACA 
TechnicalRelease2010-01.pdf.  Additional guidance was set forth in a technical 
release issued on August 23, 2010.  Id.   
 150. See supra Part II.C. 
 151. See TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 4 (requiring that an 
IRO need assess whether “[t]he claimant has exhausted the plan’s internal appeal 
process unless the claimant is not required to exhaust the internal appeals process 
under the interim final regulations”). 
 152. Id. at 5. 
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that the Firestone deference insurers enjoyed under ERISA with 
respect to court review—wherein courts needed to defer to the 
findings of an internal reviewer—will not apply with respect to 
external review.  As a matter of ACA law, external reviewers may not 
extend Firestone deference to internal reviews.153 
Obviously the value of this development to insureds will depend on 
the fairness and competence of external reviewers.  Incompetent or 
captured external reviewers will be no boon to claimants.  But assume 
external reviewers are competent and impartial.  Insurers highly 
value deference.  Might insurers and litigation reform advocates 
argue that judges, in adjudicating an ERISA claim for wrongful denial 
of coverage, need only defer to the findings of the internal reviewer, 
not the external reviewer? 
The argument is clever.  Only claimants can invoke external 
review.154  Thus, all external reviews will occur after a no-coverage or 
partial no-coverage finding by the insurer at the internal review stage.  
If the external review finds coverage and the insurer pursues the 
matter in court,155 should the court defer to the external review or 
the original internal review determination?156  Similarly, if the 
internal process finds no-coverage, the external review finds partial 
coverage, and the claimant pursues the matter in federal court 
seeking full coverage, which finding will federal courts defer to? 
The answer depends, first, on which statute—ERISA or ACA—
governs the relationship between external review and judicial review.  
Neither statute explicitly speaks to the question.  Federal courts 
would be obliged to engage in federal common-law making to fill in 
the statutory gap.157  But which federal statute drives the analysis? 
One argument is that ERISA governs because ERISA provides 
the cause of action that triggers judicial review.  The other 
argument is that the ACA governs because it requires the very 
internal and external review processes to which the judge might 
                                                          
 153. Id. 
 154. The internal review is done by the insurer or its agent; seeking external 
review of its own determination would be odd, to say the least.  None of the relevant 
regulations, either at the federal or state level, contemplate the possibility of an 
insurer seeking external review because it is unhappy with its own conclusion.   
 155. But see supra Part II.C (describing limits on insurer cause of action). 
 156. In cases in which the external and internal review finds no coverage, who the 
judge defers to is moot.  
 157. Cf. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY S. 
JOST AND ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW:  CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 683 
(7th ed. 2013) (discussing ERISA and ACA interaction and noting that “[t]he scope 
of review of federal courts reviewing decisions of health plans (or of external 
reviewers) is not, therefore, wholly clear”). 
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defer.  The ACA, so the argument goes, invested in itself the 
ultimate say on deference.158 
The answer is not clear because judicial doctrine on how to resolve 
conflict between two federal statutes is not clear.159  The better 
argument is that ERISA supplies the answer but is bounded by the 
ACA.  The cause of action being burdened is ERISA-created, and the 
sensible assumption is that the prior source of law creating the cause 
of action retains authority to resolve burdens on its use, unless a 
subsequent federal statute clearly displaces it.160 
The matter is complicated further by the lack of clarity regarding 
how ERISA “handles” external review in the wake of internal review.  
The doctrinal justification for allowing deference in the ERISA 
setting is that the employer who creates and amends an ERISA plan is 
akin to the settlor of a trust.161  Settlors have the ability to award 
specified fiduciaries power to administer the trust, including 
interpreting the trust documents.162  Such a process is thought to 
favor the creation of trusts—or in the ERISA setting, benefit plans—
and so judges must defer to administrators to whom the settlor has 
specifically awarded interpretative power in order to ensure the 
frequent creation of plans.163  Under this justification of Firestone 
deference, it would not be proper for a judge to defer to an external 
reviewer because the external reviewer was not so anointed by the 
                                                          
 158. The question is not easy as a matter of principle, policy, or politics.  If the 
ACA, by mere dint of statutorily supplying two modes of non-judicial review, also 
contains the power to define the relationship between non-judicial and judicial 
review (including by limiting the availability of subsequent judicial review), then such 
implicit power might be used in the individual insurance setting to limit state judicial 
review of a state claim.  Cf. infra Parts III.B.3, IV.C (examining the review processes 
for individual insurers and an anti-judicialism view of the ACA). 
 159. See infra notes 263–67 and accompanying text (discussing court canons on 
federal statutory conflict). 
 160. I am not suggesting that the law creating the cause of action always or 
entirely supplies the common law rules affecting use of the cause of action, just 
that it makes sense here and probably often.  Cf. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of 
General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 538–52 (2006) (discussing how “policy 
bundles” can determine, in a federal versus state context, which law affects a given 
cause of action). 
 161. See Maher, supra note 33, at 680 (explaining how deference is justified by 
describing the employer creating an ERISA plan akin to a “settlor” who, in a 
common-law trust, may grant discretionary power to a trustee). 
 162. See Langbein, supra note 42, at 218–19 (citing trust law precedent from 
Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 717 (1875), supporting judicial deference to trustees 
exercising “discretion vested in them by the instrument under which they act”). 
 163. See, e.g., id. at 218, 221 (discussing the court’s holding in Lowry v. Bankers 
Life & Cas. Ret. Plan, 865 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1989), that an administrator’s 
determinations should be given deference when the trust instrument—i.e., the 
plan—evidences the power of the administrator to “construe uncertain terms” 
because “[d]iscretion is a touchstone of trusteeship”). 
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settlor.164  The consequence would be that, although claimants may 
choose external review, upon appeal to a court afterward, the court 
must defer to the internal review conclusions rather than those of the 
external review. 
Such a rule would make external review effectively useless in every 
case in which the internal reviewer and external reviewer differ.  
Assume an insurer denies coverage and an external reviewer finds 
coverage.  If a court must defer to the internal reviewer absent 
arbitrary and capricious behavior, then insurance companies will 
appeal every adverse external review determination in order to secure 
a more favorable standard of review.  External review would undo no 
more “wrong” outcomes than its absence.  Given the ACA’s provision 
for both internal and external review, that makes no sense. 
Instead, ERISA should yield to the ACA with respect to the 
treatment of external review by judges.  The ACA bounds the inquiry:  
judges must either review the matter (1) de novo, that is, without 
weight afforded either to internal or external review; or (2) afford 
weight to the external reviewer’s finding only.165  Whether judges 
need do the former or the latter would be resolved by ERISA, with 
neither option enfeebling the ACA’s external review provisions.  
Incidentally, it is not clear whether, from an ERISA standpoint, a 
judge should review external review de novo or with deference, 
although de novo review seems more likely.166 
                                                          
 164. Employers or insurers writing in discretionary clauses are acting as settlors 
under current Supreme Court doctrine.  Cf. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
Advisory Opinion No. 2003-04A, 2003 WL 1785266 (Dep’t of Labor Mar. 26, 2003) 
(explaining that discretionary activities relating to plan formation, as opposed to 
plan management, are “settlor” functions and are generally not fiduciary activities 
governed by ERISA). 
 165. Conversely, affording weight to the external reviewer’s finding does not 
render internal review useless.  For self-insured plans, internal review is required, 
and in many cases a claimant will simply stop there.  Vukadin, supra note 29, at 1204.  
In other cases, external review will reach the same result as internal review, and thus 
provide the same uphill battle in court that would have been the case pre-ACA.  Only 
when external review reaches a different result than internal review will internal 
review’s weight be “diminished” relative to the pre-ACA world.  See TECHNICAL 
RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 6 (requiring plans to provide coverage if the 
external review reverses the adverse benefit determination).  One of the central aims 
of external review, however, is to serve as a check on internal review.  Necessarily the 
expectation is that internal review is of diminished importance.  Cf. Kenneth H. 
Chuang, Wade M. Aubry & R. Adams Dudley, Independent Medical Review of Health 
Plan Coverage Denials:  Early Trends, 23 HEALTH AFF., no. 6, 2004, at 163, 163–69 
(reporting the results of a study finding that 33% of internal denials in California 
were overturned via external review). 
 166. The technical arguments each will make as to what ERISA requires will 
depend largely on the degree to which, if at all, independent review organizations 
that provide the external reviews are perceived as favoring claimants or insurers.  For 
example, the current federal guidance only provides that insurers contract with three 
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Observation two.  ERISA requires deference to internal review only if 
the plan so provides.167  The ACA upends that rule with respect to 
circumstances where a claimant has sought external review because, 
as explained above, not doing so would render external review a 
waste of time.  But what of judicial deference to internal reviewers if 
no external review has occurred? 
Presumably external review is a choice; a claimant can seek it or 
not, and in any event proceed with judicial review.168  If a claimant 
does not seek external review, then the ACA provides no explicit 
reason why a judge should not extend Firestone deference to an 
internal review.169  The likelihood that a judge would therefore grant 
Firestone deference to an internal review gives claimants an obvious 
incentive to utilize external review.  If claimants proceed right to 
court after internal review, they face a Firestone obstacle. 
The same goes if the claimant cannot seek external review because 
the coverage dispute relates to a matter outside the scope of external 
review.170  Presumably in that circumstance judicial deference will still 
be due to the internal reviewer.  In practice, we will likely see 
protracted arguments about what type of dispute is properly 
encompassed by external review regulations.  Already, public 
comments from those in favor of litigation reform have persuaded 
the federal agencies charged with writing the ACA’s implementing 
                                                          
accredited IROs.  TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 4.  Three might 
not be enough to ensure true impartiality. 
 167. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (explaining Firestone deference). 
 168. The external review regulations for self-insured plans do not specify whether 
external review is required before judicial review, or merely an option.  29 C.F.R. 
§ 2590.715-2719(d) (2013); TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 2–3.  
However, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 considers all types of non-judicial appeals of claims 
denial beyond the internal review process as “voluntary” appeals.  29 C.F.R. 
§ 2560.503-1(c)(3)–(4).  This regulation was expressly incorporated into the ACA, 
and the legislation’s subsequent implementing regulations incorporated its 
requirements and added to them.  29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii).  Moreover, 
the federal external review process must be “similar” to the state external review 
processes the ACA contemplates, and the NAIC-UERMA assumes external review is a 
choice.  See infra notes 234–38 and accompanying text.  Finally, should an internal 
review process violate federal regulations, then the regulations explicitly provide that 
an insured may pursue external or judicial review.  29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-
2719(b)(2)(ii)(F)(1).  Nothing in the statute, legislative history, or implementing 
regulations suggest that a choice between external or judicial review is not available 
to claimants merely because an insurer complied with all internal review regulations. 
 169. Whether it implies a reason I leave to the reader.  See infra Part IV.A 
(discussing the flexible nature of jurisprudential devices concerning preemption and 
federal statutory conflict). 
 170. External review is available based on the plan’s requirements for “medical 
necessity, appropriateness, health care setting, level of care, or effectiveness of a 
covered benefit.”  29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(i). 
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regulations to, at least temporarily, modestly restrict the scope of 
external review coverage.171 
Observation three.  There is a final, technical wrinkle that will catch 
some self-insured plans unawares.  Assume during internal review the 
plan denies coverage, but on external review coverage is found.  Can 
the plan appeal the matter to court?172 
The ACA does not create a cause of action for coverage disputes 
for either insureds or insurers.173  Self-insured plans’ available causes 
of action are governed by ERISA.174  The hitch is that ERISA does not 
provide an insurer with an § 1132(a)(1)(B) “coverage dispute” cause 
of action; that remedy is only available to beneficiaries.175  An insurer 
must articulate a claim under one of ERISA’s other remedial 
provisions to appeal an external review finding. 
Plans almost certainly will invoke § 1132(a)(3).  That provision of 
ERISA, which authorizes “appropriate equitable relief,”176 has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court to supply only those remedies 
“typically” cognizable in pre-merger equity.177  The Court, however, 
has read equitable history to find that plans may secure equitable 
relief through the expedient device of a “lien by agreement.”178  Lien 
by agreement was an equitable device used to recover monies 
promised by prior agreement.179  Plan drafters currently use the “lien 
by agreement” mechanism to write clauses into plans that effect, 
essentially by contract, expansive recovery and preference rights for 
                                                          
 171. Group Health Plans Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and 
External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,216 (June 24, 2011) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 117) (explaining that public commentary led the Departments to “narrow 
the scope” of claims eligible for federal external review). 
 172. This will also affect group-insured plans, because the remedies there are supplied 
by ERISA.  See supra Part II.C (explaining how ERISA supplies the cause of action for 
coverage denials under group-insured plans because of conflict preemption). 
 173. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that the ACA does not 
explicitly create a cause of action, nor is it likely that an implied right of action exists). 
 174. Supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.  
 175. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2012) (“A civil action may be brought . . . by a 
participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his 
plan . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 176. Id. § 1132(a)(3).  
 177. E.g., CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1878 (2011) (quoting Sereboff v. 
Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361 (2006)); see also Great-West Life & Annuity 
Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002) (discussing historical equity test); Mertens 
v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (creating historical equity test). 
 178. See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1546 (2013) (“US 
Airways . . . is seeking to enforce the modern-day equivalent of an ‘equitable lien by 
agreement.’  And that kind of lien . . . both arises from and serves to carry out a 
contract’s provisions.”). 
 179. See, e.g., id. at 1545 (acknowledging US Airways’s right to seek funds promised 
under a contract through an equitable lien by agreement). 
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plans vis-à-vis insureds.180  Smart self-insurers will rewrite their plans 
to include lien by agreement rights against insureds to challenge 
unfavorable external review results in court.  Whether and how 
exactly the lien by agreement device can be used on this question is 
unsettled, and there will be litigation over the details. 
2. Group-insured plans 
Group insurers must abide by internal review requirements 
promulgated by the Department of Labor.181  In contrast, with respect 
to external review, group-insured plans must comply with state law, 
with one key exception.182  If the applicable state law does not meet 
or exceed the consumer protections set forth in the Uniform Health 
Carrier External Review Model Act (“NAIC-UERMA” or “the Model 
Act”),183 which was promulgated by the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners, then the insurer in question must comply 
with a federal external review process promulgated by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).184  Because of 
                                                          
 180. See generally id. (permitting insurers to write in subrogation provisions that 
override both the “common fund” and “double recovery” equitable limits on 
subrogation recoveries by insurers); see also Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, 
Understanding and Problematizing Contractual Tort Subrogation, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 49, 
81–85 (2008) (describing the “lien by agreement” mechanism, which permits 
insurers to effectively seek contractual subrogation against an insured—i.e., “any 
recovery from the tortfeasor will be diminished by the reimbursement of medical 
expenses advanced by the insurer”—and noting that “virtually all modern policies 
have subrogation provisions, many of which are of the first-dollar recovery variety”).  
Critics of the Court’s “lien by agreement” jurisprudence, including myself, worry that 
it supplies insurers with a contractual blank check against insureds.  See Brief for 
Respondents at 36, US Airways, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (No. 11-1285) (observing that a “lien 
by agreement” can be applied against property unrelated to sickness or accident, 
such as “100 percent of any future inheritance received by the insured”).   
 181. The statutory language refers to “a group health plan and a health insurance 
issuer offering group health coverage.”  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(2)(A).  A group 
health plan includes a self-insured plan.  See Group Health Plans Rules Relating to 
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,208 (June 
24, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 117) (explaining that the “group health 
plan” includes both self-insured plans and plans using group insurers); see also id. at 
37,208 n.1 (“The term ‘group health plan’ is used in title XXVII of the PHS Act, part 
7 of ERISA, and chapter 100 of the Code, and is distinct from the term ‘health plan’, 
as used in other provisions of title I of the Affordable Care Act.  The term ‘health 
plan’, as used in those provisions, does not include self-insured group health 
plans.”).  The Department of Labor was given regulatory authority over the internal 
review processes for self-insured plans and group plans using group insurers (which I 
refer to as “group-insured plans”).  
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b)(1)–(2). 
 183. UNIFORM HEALTH CARRIER EXTERNAL REVIEW MODEL ACT §§ 5, 8–10, 13, 17 
(Nat’l Assoc. of Ins. Comm. 2010) [hereinafter NAIC-UERMA], available at http://www 
.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/externalreviewmodelact.pdf. 
 184. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 37,211 n.14 (explaining that the federal external review 
process applicable in the absence of sufficient state law will be determined by HHS); 
see also OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
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conflict preemption, the cause of action for coverage denials 
occurring in group-insured plans is provided by ERISA.185 
Observation one.  The question of whether external reviewers must 
defer to internal reviewers in the context of group-insured plans will 
likely attract attention, for several reasons.  First, it is clearly a matter 
of state law.  More specifically, the ACA adverts to state authority on 
external review, assuming the state external review law exceeds the 
“consumer protections” in the NAIC-UERMA: 
(b) External Review—A group health plan and a health insurance 
issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage—(1) 
shall comply with the applicable State external review process for 
such plans and issuers that, at a minimum, includes the consumer 
protections set forth in the Uniform External Review Model Act 
promulgated by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners and is binding on such plans; or (2) shall 
implement an effective external review process that meets 
minimum standards established by the Secretary through guidance 
and that is similar to the process described under paragraph (1)—
(A) if the applicable State has not established an external review 
process that meets the requirements of paragraph (1); or (B) if the 
plan is a self-insured plan that is not subject to State insurance 
regulation (including a State law that establishes an external review 
process described in paragraph (1)).186 
External review state laws do not have to be “like” the NAIC-
UERMA; they just need to be as protective of consumers as it is.  If 
the state law satisfies that threshold condition, then the only 
additional constraint is that the state law must actually regulate 
external review.187 
                                                          
SERVS., TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR INTERIM PROCEDURES FOR FEDERAL EXTERNAL REVIEW, 
4–14 (2010) [hereinafter EXTERNAL REVIEW GUIDANCE], available at http://www.cms 
.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/interim_appeals_guidance.pdf (setting forth 
external review process for group-insured plans, and individual insurers, in states that lack 
sufficient external review rules).  State external review law can be insufficient because 
it exists but lacks the consumer protections of the NAIC-UERMA, or because it does 
not exist at all.  Interestingly, in contrast to the technical guidance relating to 
external review for self-insured plans promulgated by Labor, the technical guidance 
for group-insured plans subject to federal regulation because of insufficient state 
regulation (which is promulgated by HHS) does not explicitly require exhaustion of 
the internal process prior to seeking external review.  Compare EXTERNAL REVIEW 
GUIDANCE, supra, at 5–11 (exhaustion requirement absent from HHS guidance), with 
TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 4 (including a provision that an 
IRO need assess whether “[t]he claimant has exhausted the plan’s internal appeal 
process unless the claimant is not required to exhaust the internal appeals process 
under the interim final regulations”).  
 185. See supra Part II.C. 
 186. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b). 
 187. The federally defined consumer protective minimums are set forth in 29 
C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2) (2013). The outer boundaries of the set of state 
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The ACA supplies two limiting conditions on a state seeking to 
regulate external review:  (1) state rules must satisfy a federally 
defined consumer-protective minimum and (2) the rules must be 
“about” external review.  The latter seems so obvious as to not need 
acknowledgement, but it warrants consideration.  Note that from a 
state regulator’s perspective those two conditions are less onerous 
than the following three:  (1) having to satisfy a federally defined 
minimum, (2) having to be about external review, and (3) having to 
be “like” the NAIC-UERMA.  The latter set of conditions arguably 
imposes a ceiling on how pro-consumer a state can be, i.e., states 
cannot be more pro-consumer than the NAIC-UERMA.  The former 
set of conditions does not.  The former is the law. 
For example, the NAIC-UERMA requires exhaustion of internal 
review prior to external review, absent special circumstances.188  
Unsurprisingly, requiring exhaustion of internal review is not a 
minimum consumer protection.189  Accordingly, a state that otherwise 
satisfied the consumer protective minimums could “legislate up” 
from NAIC-UERMA and not require internal exhaustion with respect 
to external review. 
Federal law does somewhat limit state prerogative to insert 
claimant-unfriendly provisions in its external review laws by requiring 
that state law contain the “consumer protection” minimums of the 
NAIC-UERMA.190  Interestingly, current federal regulations that have 
defined the minimum “consumer protections” state law must provide 
do not reference the provision of the NAIC-UERMA that forbids 
                                                          
regulations that are “about” or “actually regulate” external review is not clear.  
Whether a state regulation falls within the ACA’s external review preemption carve-
out will be litigated, certainly with respect to state regulations insurers dislike.  
 188. See supra note 183, § 7(A)(1) (“Exhaustion of Internal Grievance Process[:]  
Except as provided in subsection B, a request for an external review pursuant to 
section 8, 9 or 10 of this Act shall not be made until the covered person has 
exhausted the health carrier’s internal grievance process . . . .”).  The NAIC-UERMA 
referenced in the ACA was the NAIC-UERMA in effect on July 23, 2010.  29 C.F.R. 
§ 2590.715-2719(a)(2)(viii). 
 189. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2) (listed consumer protection minimums 
do not include exhaustion of internal review before external review); Cf. U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2011-02, GUIDANCE ON EXTERNAL REVIEW FOR 
GROUP HEALTH PLANS AND HEALTH INSURANCE ISSUERS OFFERING GROUP AND 
INDIVIDUAL HEALTH COVERAGE, AND GUIDANCE FOR STATE ON STATE EXTERNAL REVIEW 
PROCESS 2 (2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/tr11-02.pdf (“If 
exhaustion of internal appeals is required prior to external review, exhaustion must 
be unnecessary [in certain conditions protective of consumers].”).  For group-
insured plans, this clearly contemplates state prerogative bounded by a federal 
consumer-protective floor. 
 190. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b). 
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deference.191  Thus a state could, under the current regulations, 
“legislate down” and enact an external review statute that supplies all 
the consumer protections of the NAIC-UERMA, but permits external 
reviewers to defer to the findings of internal reviewers (or construe 
the insurance agreement in favor of the insurer). 
Observation two.  A second interesting issue involves the NAIC-
UERMA’s language on deference.  The NAIC-UERMA provides that 
external reviewers should exhibit no deference to the determinations 
of internal reviewers.192 
One may wonder whether the NAIC-UERMA requirement that the 
external reviewer not be “bound” by an internal reviewer’s 
conclusions or determinations absolutely bars deference.  One 
expects arguments from litigation reform advocates designed to 
smuggle in some form of hidden deference to internal review, 
perhaps an argument that, although external reviewers may not be 
“bound” by what happened in internal review, they should attribute 
extra weight to the results of the internal review absent clear 
indication of malfeasance.  Arguments may also be made over the 
difference between the relevant federal and state regulations.  Unlike 
the federal regulations limiting deference, the NAIC-UERMA does 
not use the word “de novo”; perhaps this difference means state 
external reviewers can favor insurers.193  A similar argument might 
urge that the NAIC-UERMA’s language forbidding external reviewers 
to be “bound” does not prevent external reviewers from having to 
honor, in the first, instance provisions in the insurance agreement 
that require ambiguous clauses to be construed in favor of the 
insurer.194  To be clear, I do not find any of the foregoing arguments 
persuasive—the patent intent of the NAIC-UERMA as written is to 
                                                          
 191. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(i)–(xvi) (required consumer 
protections do not include a “no deference” rule), with NAIC-UERMA, supra note 
183, § 8(D)(2) (no deference due by external reviewers to internal reviewers). 
 192. NAIC-UERMA, supra note 183, § 8(D)(2) (“In reaching a decision, the 
assigned independent review organization is not bound by any decisions or 
conclusions reached during the health carrier’s [internal claims process].”).  
 193. Compare id. (“In reaching a decision, the assigned independent review 
organization is not bound by any decisions or conclusions [of internal reviewers].”), 
with TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-01, supra note 149, at 4–5 (“A contract between the 
plan and an IRO must provide the following:  . . . [i]n reaching a decision, the 
assigned IRO will review the claim de novo and not be bound by any decisions or 
conclusions reached during the [health insurance issuer’s] internal claims and 
appeals process.”).   
 194. For example, consider a provision providing that “the parties agree that the 
meaning of this policy is such that is consistent with whatever interpretation is most 
favorable to the insurer.”  The question is whether the external reviewer would have 
to interpret the meaning of the policy consistent with the expressed intent of the 
parties by calling all close cases in favor of the insurer. 
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provide consumers (at a minimum) with completely neutral and 
impartial review. 
States, however, can avoid such quarrels by adopting language in 
their external review laws that more clearly prohibits deference owed 
to the internal reviewer and otherwise forbids the insurance contract 
to be interpreted under any standard less favorable to the claimant 
than de novo.  In other cases, state background law may be 
sufficiently clear.195  Because the ACA contemplates state freedom 
once certain protective minimums are met, those issues are questions 
of law for the implementing state.196  Claimant-friendly states will 
likely not only bar deference,197 but also require external reviewers to 
follow contra proferentum. 
Observation three.  The provision of the ACA that adverts to state 
power over external review processes is section 2719(b) of the 
Public Health Services Act (PHSA).198  Section 2719 of the PHSA, 
in turn, is part of the ACA that was directly incorporated into 
ERISA.199  Thus ERISA itself now includes language adverting to 
                                                          
 195. For example, consider Illinois.  The general rule is that “provisions that limit 
or exclude coverage are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and most 
strongly against the insurer.”  Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Glenview 
Park Dist., 632 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 (Ill. 1994).  Contractual modification of that rule 
in health insurance policies is barred.  See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, § 2001.3 (2010) 
(“No policy . . . offered or issued in this State, by a health carrier, to provide, deliver, 
arrange for, pay for or reimburse any of the costs of health care services . . . may 
contain a provision purporting to reserve discretion to the health carrier to interpret 
the terms of the contract, or to provide standards of interpretation or review that are 
inconsistent with the laws of this State.”).  Of course, even states that already follow 
anti-deference principles as a part of their background law may wish to explicitly 
incorporate them into their external review statutes. 
 196. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (outlining the flexibility afforded 
to states implementing an external review process other than the NAIC-UERMA). 
 197. In a piece written prior to the promulgation of the ACA’s implementing 
regulations, Professor Hylton concluded that states will endeavor to ban judicial 
deference “in order to rectify the unfairness that Firestone deference could continue 
to create for plan participants and beneficiaries.”  Maria O’Brien Hylton, Post-
Firestone Skirmishes:  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Discretionary Clauses, 
and Judicial Review of ERISA Plan Administrator Decisions, 2 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 25 
(2010).  Although Professor Hilton correctly guessed that ACA external reviewers 
need not defer to internal reviews, id. at 19, Professor Hilton did not consider 
(because that was not the aim of her article) how the ACA affected the relationship 
between external review and judicial review. 
 198. Section 2719(b) of the PHSA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b) (2012). 
 199. The ACA added section 715(a)(1) to ERISA.  ERISA section 715(a)(1) 
incorporates by reference the requirements of PHSA section 2719, which is codified 
in the ACA at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19.  ERISA section 715(a)(1) is codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1185d.  Section 715(a)(1) of ERISA now reads that “part A of title XXVII of the 
Public Health Service Act [which includes the section of ACA adverting to state 
power over external review] . . . shall apply to group health plans, and health 
insurance issuers providing health insurance coverage in connection with group 
health plans, as if included in this subpart [of ERISA].”  Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 715, 124 Stat. 119, 270 (2010) (codified 
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state authority regarding external review processes.200  The 
consequence of this amendment of ERISA on its preemptive effect 
is potentially quite significant. 
Recall that under ERISA’s explicit, statutorily provided rules of 
preemption, states could not directly regulate benefit plans.201  
Because of the savings clause in ERISA, however, states could regulate 
insurers issuing group coverage in connection with a benefit plan, by 
means of “saved” state insurance laws.202  Such “saved” state power is 
in turn limited by (implicit) conflict preemption, the scope of which 
is not clear, but which at a minimum prevents states from supplying 
group-insured claimants with state causes of action or additional 
heads of damages.203 
With respect to the regulation of external review, one sensible way 
to read ERISA section 715(a)(1) is that it now permits states to 
entirely bypass ERISA’s explicit preemption provisions.204  In the 
                                                          
at 29 U.S.C. § 1185d(a)).  The language of the ERISA amendment is very strong—it 
even permits, on its face, direct state regulation of group health plans.  They apparently 
no longer have to resort to the expedient of regulating group insurers.  
 200. Cf. Vukadin, supra note 29, at 1212 (asserting that the “[]ACA also amended 
ERISA to make clear that ERISA plans are also bound by the new external review 
requirement”).  The external review requirements are in large part defined by states.  
Professors Vukadin and Jost, see infra note 204, are the only professors to have 
considered the provision.  No reported decision has done so. 
 201. 29 U.S.C § 1144(a)–(b); supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text 
(explaining ERISA’s “deemer” clause). 
 202. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (explaining contours of ERISA 
preemption). 
 203. See Pathak, supra note 56, at 512–13. 
 204. The entire text of the relevant ERISA provision is: 
§ 1185d.  Additional market reforms 
(a) General rule 
Except as provided in subsection (b)— 
(1) the provisions of part A of title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act 
(as amended by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) shall apply 
to group health plans, and health insurance issuers providing health 
insurance coverage in connection with group health plans, as if included in 
this subpart; and 
(2) to the extent that any provision of this part [7] conflicts with a provision 
of such part A with respect to group health plans, or health insurance issuers 
providing health insurance coverage in connection with group health plans, 
the provisions of such part A shall apply. 
(b) Exception 
Notwithstanding subsection (a), the provisions of sections 2716 and 2718 of 
title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act (as amended by the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act) shall not apply with respect to self-
insured group health plans, and the provisions of this part shall continue to 
apply to such plans as if such sections of the Public Health Service Act (as so 
amended) had not been enacted. 
29 U.S.C. § 1185d(a)–(b).  Litigation reformers seeking to preserve ERISA 
preemption with respect to external review will likely argue that while section 
1185d(a)(1) incorporates various sections of the ACA directly into ERISA, including 
the external review provisions, section 1185(d)(a)(2) has the ACA affirmatively 
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ACA, Congress has, in effect, withdrawn federal power to regulate the 
external review processes (beyond setting minimums) and amended 
ERISA to follow ACA.  Accordingly, states would face no explicit 
ERISA preemption regarding legitimate regulation of external review 
processes.  The practical effect would be that states no longer need 
show that a law is a “saved” insurance law; they need only show the 
law legitimately regulates external review, or so goes the argument.205 
The effect that the ACA’s amending of ERISA has on ERISA’s 
conflict preemption is even harder to discern.  The Supreme Court, 
however, has made clear that, as a general matter, external review is 
outside conflict preemption.206  The ACA codifies that thinking; 
indeed, the Model Act used by the ACA as a referent envisions 
external reviewers supplying no Firestone deference to internal 
                                                          
overthrowing ERISA only with respect to Part 7 of ERISA, and Part 7 of ERISA 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181–1191c) does not include the ERISA preemption 
provisions (codified at 29 U.S.C § 1144).  Thus, the common law of intra-federal 
statutory conflict would need to be resolved whether the ACA’s conferring of 
external review power on states diminishes ERISA’s explicit preemption provisions.   
There are at least two difficulties with that argument.  First, it amounts to reading 
the section 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(b)(1) of the ACA as conferring upon states no 
additional power to regulate external review beyond that which ERISA already 
permits.  Second, ERISA itself has a provision denying it the power to “supersede any 
law of the United States . . . or any rule or regulation issued under any such law.”  29 
U.S.C. § 1144(d).  But see Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 
U.S. 365, 375 (1990) (acknowledging 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) in another setting but 
finding it inapplicable).  The only other professor to have considered the matter 
even obliquely is Professor Timothy Stoltzfus Jost.  He reads the ACA to displace 
contrary ERISA authority because it regulates “group health plans,” which includes 
ERISA plans.  See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Loopholes in the Affordable Care Act:  Regulatory 
Gaps and Border Crossing Techniques and How to Address Them, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 27, 28 (2011) (reading section 1185d as “not strictly necessary, as the 
provisions of the ACA on their own terms apply to group health plans, which are 
defined to include ERISA plans”).  In any event, it seems highly likely that resolution 
of this question will depend in material part on realist forces.  See supra Part IV. 
 205. Professor Jost may be alluding to this point when he reads the ACA to 
collapse regulatory distinctions between “group health plans” and “health insurance 
issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage.”  Jost, supra note 204, 
at 28.  I say “may” because Professor Jost’s fine article does not squarely concern itself 
with preemption or remedy.   
I note as an aside that perhaps in part because of my views on the importance of 
remedy, I may differ with Professor Jost on the degree of federalism the ACA 
contemplates.  See id. at 28 (concluding that “the ACA lays out a comprehensive 
federal law framework for revolutionizing the underwriting practices of health 
insurers, stimulating competition in the health insurance industry, and protecting 
health insurance consumers” (emphasis added)). Cf. Brendan S. Maher & Radha 
Pathak, Enough About the Constitution:  How States Can Regulate Health Insurance Under 
the ACA, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 275 (2013) (arguing that the ACA possesses 
considerable potential for states to exercise regulatory power); Brendan S. Maher & 
Radha Pathak, Health Insurance & Federalism-in-Fact, 28 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73 
(2012) (same). 
 206. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002) (rejecting 
the argument that external review procedures ran afoul of conflict preemption); see 
also Pathak, supra note 56, at 511 (explaining Moran). 
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reviews.207  Yet the relationship between external review and judicial 
review is more complicated than that because it edges closer to 
ERISA conflict preemption.  Under the old jurisprudence of conflict 
preemption, ERISA supplies the cause of action for a coverage denial 
in connection with a group-insured plan.208  Presumably then, just 
like in the self-insured context, ERISA would govern how judicial 
review need treat internal review and external review, absent a 
conflict with the ACA. 
In the self-insured plan context, I argued that although ERISA 
generally governed the way in which a court need treat internal or 
external review, the ACA barred judicial deference to internal 
reviewers where external review had occurred.209  The same applies 
here with an additional twist.  The ACA explicitly gave states the 
power to control the external review process, and amended ERISA 
accordingly.  What occurs, with respect to judicial review, if a state 
provides that external reviewers must follow contra proferentem?  
Assume in such a state that a claimant loses an internal review and 
then prevails partially on external review, appealing the matter to 
federal court.  Not reviewing the matter using a contra proferentem 
standard indirectly frustrates the exercise of a state’s external review 
power that the ACA specifically sanctions.  On the other hand, 
requiring that contra proferentem be applied by judges arguably 
conflicts with ERISA’s remedial scheme (which permits contractual 
modification of the review standard).210  The question will certainly 
be litigated. 
3. Individual insurance 
The ACA revitalizes (and swells participation in) individual insurance 
markets; as a result the rules of remedy for individual insurance policies 
                                                          
 207. Supra notes 187–95 and accompanying text.   
 208. Supra note 119–26 and accompanying text.  I can see arguments that the ACA 
might relax that somewhat, and provide room for very limited “supplementary” 
causes of action or damages.  But I think it is safer to assume, realistically, that ERISA 
still supplies the sole cause of action for a coverage denial and preempts all state 
causes of action and damages.   
 209. See supra Part III.B.1 (explaining, in “observation one,” the likely effect of the 
ACA on deference). 
 210. As Professor Pathak has explained, the status of state laws limiting judicial 
deference has not been conclusively resolved as a pure ERISA matter, independent 
of any change effected by the ACA.  See Pathak, supra note 56, at 502 (observing that 
only three circuit courts of appeal have evaluated whether “state regulation of 
discretionary clauses is preempted by ERISA”); see also supra Part II.C (discussing 
judicial review under the ACA). 
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will achieve much more practical significance.211  Interest in and 
opposition to litigation reform will increase correspondingly. 
ACA requires that all insurers offer internal review.  Individual 
insurers must comply with state law existing at the date of the ACA’s 
enactment and with any standards adopted by HHS.212  HHS has 
promulgated requirements similar to those of the Department of 
Labor, with a few additional requirements specific to the 
circumstances of individual insurance policies.213  As for external 
review, like group-insured plans, individual insurers must comply with 
state law, so long as state law satisfies the consumer protective 
minimums.214  Unlike self-insured and group-insured plans, however, 
the causes of action available to remediate coverage denials are 
provided by state law.215 
Prior to the ACA, federal power over individual insurance policies 
was largely nonexistent.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act216 provides that 
federal statutes—unless specifically regulating the “business of 
insurance”—do not preempt state insurance law.217  ERISA was an 
example of a specific federal law regulating the business of insurance, 
but ERISA is limited to employment-based insurance provided via a 
benefit plan.  It has no application whatsoever to individual insurance 
policies.  The ACA, however, does regulate individual insurance 
policies, and this exercise of federal power will serve as the basis for 
litigation reformers to argue that the ACA “implies” various litigation-
reform restrictions of state prerogative. 
The consequence of the fact that state causes of action govern 
coverage disputes for individual insurance policies is apparent.218  In 
many states, insurance litigation rules are friendly to claimants, 
including, in some cases, committing the ultimate crime of offering 
                                                          
 211. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 20 tbl.3 (estimating insurance 
exchange enrollment). 
 212. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(2)(B)(2012).   
 213. Compare 45 C.F.R § 147.136(b)(3) (2013) (outlining additional requirements 
for individual health insurance issuers), with 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (establishing a 
claims procedure under the authority of ERISA for group-insured plans). 
 214. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (noting the ACA requires external 
review be made available to all insureds, including those with individual coverage). 
 215. See supra Part II.C (outlining the source of a claimant’s cause of action 
depending on the type of insurance arrangement). 
 216. Pub. L. No. 79-14, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1011–1015). 
 217. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a)–(b). 
 218. ERISA’s § 1132(a)(1)(B) cause of action for claim denial is quite attractive to 
litigation reformers, for reasons explained in Part I.B.  Thus, in the self-insured and 
group-insured context, the temptation to argue that the ACA, by requiring internal 
and external review, somehow conceives of a new remedial scheme that totally 
extinguishes a claimant’s ERISA rights, will be comparatively small.  But see infra Part 
IV.B (discussing the anti-judicial review theme). 
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the most industry-reviled feature of traditional relief:  punitive 
damages.219  The temptation for litigation reformers to argue that the 
ACA extinguishes state causes of action, or severely limits them, will 
be overwhelming.220 
Observation one.  I start with the most extreme argument:  that the 
ACA extinguishes state law claims and leaves consumers with only the 
options of internal and external review.  The ACA after all, does not 
say that any cause of action, federal or state, survives as a third 
remedial option.221 
The statute and implementing regulations, however, offer no 
support for the “extinguishment” argument.  The legislation’s only 
express acknowledgement of litigation reform is cabined entirely to 
the creation of a grant system for demonstrative, pilot programs that 
aim to offer suitable alternatives to tort litigation.  Even that grant 
system is clearly aimed at providing alternatives to litigation over 
disputes more accurately characterized as being (or akin to) medical 
malpractice, rather than coverage denials.222  As for the 
implementing regulations, both ERISA and state claims survive the 
ACA’s provision of internal and external review:  the (1) NAIC-
UERMA itself, (2) the list of minimum consumer protections state 
law must have, and (3) the federal external review process all require 
                                                          
 219. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 624.155(5) (2013) (authorizing punitive damages 
against insurer); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (2013) (same); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, 
§ 9.1 (2013) (same); see also supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (noting 
that insureds generally have more remedies available under state insurance laws 
than ERISA). 
 220. Cf. Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly:  Federal Preemption of State Tort 
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 561 (1997) (explaining how frequently 
“corporations have attempted to turn [federal] statutes from regulatory swords 
into private shields”). 
 221. The House passed the “Affordable Health Care for America Act” (H.R. 3962) 
on November 7, 2009, while the Senate passed the “Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act” (H.R. 3590) on December 24, 2009.  The latter was the statute 
that primarily became law.  The House bill, H.R. 3962, did have a provision 
guaranteeing that the Act did not extinguish prior judicial remedies.  See Affordable 
Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 232(e) (2009) (providing 
that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed as affecting the availability of 
judicial review under State law for adverse decisions”). 
 222. See 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15(a) (granting available to States “for the development, 
implementation, and evaluation of alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving 
disputes over injuries allegedly caused by health care providers or health care 
organizations,” and “allows for the resolution of disputes over injuries allegedly 
caused by health care providers or health care organizations; and . . . promotes a 
reduction of health care errors by encouraging the collection and analysis of patient 
safety data related to disputes resolved . . . by organizations that engage in efforts to 
improve patient safety and the quality of health care”). 
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that an external review decision is binding “except to the extent” that 
other remedies are available under state or federal law.223 
Additionally, nothing in the legislative history of the statute 
supports extinguishment.224  Republican opponents of both the 
House and Senate bills (the latter of which would essentially become 
the ACA) repeatedly decried the lack of litigation reform in the 
bills.225  Yet not a single speaker in favor of or against the bill that 
became law applauded, attacked, or even mentioned any possibility 
that the ACA would extinguish causes of action or judicial review in 
the health insurance context.226 
Indeed, given the statute, regulations, and legislative history, the 
suggestion that the ACA extinguishes by implication any coverage 
denial cause of action under state law (or for that matter, ERISA227) 
borders on the frivolous.  I am mindful, however, of how 
constitutional scholars confidently dismissed the merit of early 
                                                          
 223. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719 (c)(2)(xi) (2013) (“The State process must 
provide that the decision is binding on the plan or issuer, as well as the claimant, 
except to the extent other remedies are available under State or Federal law.”); 45 
C.F.R. § 147.136 (d)(2)(iv) (“These [federal] standards will provide that an external 
review decision is binding on the plan or issuer, as well as the claimant, except to the 
extent other remedies are available under State or Federal law.”); NAIC-UERMA, 
supra note 183, § 11(B) (“An external review decision is binding on the covered 
person except to the extent the covered person has other remedies available under 
applicable federal or State law.”). 
Also, the model notice for a final external review decision includes the following 
language:  “If we have upheld the denial, there is no further review available under 
the appeals process.  However, you may have other remedies available under State or 
Federal law, such as filing a lawsuit.”  Model Notice of Final External Review Decision, 
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/IABDModelNotice3.doc (last updated 
June 22, 2011).  If the ACA extinguished post-external review judicial remedies, that 
line would be superfluous.  It does not, of course, imply that post-external judicial 
remedies might not be modified. 
 224. Because of the unusual nature by which the ACA became law, it is difficult to 
say precisely what is the “official” legislative history of the ACA.  See John Cannan, A 
Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act:  How Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative 
History, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 131, 136–68 (2013) (explaining the complicated legislative 
history of the ACA). 
 225. Virtually all of the talk running up to the bill was about medical malpractice 
liability reform, which Republicans ceaselessly complained the health care bills did 
not contain.  See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. 29,590 (2010) (statement of Sen. McCain) 
(“The reason why tort reform is not in the bill is because the people who wrote it did 
not want to take on the trial lawyers.”); 155 CONG. REC. S13719 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 
2009) (statement of Senator Vitter) (“Let’s pass tort reform and take all that 
unnecessary cost out of the system.”); 155 CONG. REC. S13,811 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 
2009) (statement of Senator Bond) (explaining that if a health care bill “eliminated 
frivolous lawsuits . . . [the bill sponsors] could probably get 80 or 90 truly bipartisan 
votes”).  If the extinguishment of health insurance remedies were in the ACA, surely 
that would have been mentioned in the back and forth between Democratic and 
Republican Senators and Representatives. 
 226. See generally 155 Cong. Rec. S13,796 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009); 155 Cong. Rec. 
S13,719 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2009); 155 Cong. Rec. at 29,590. 
 227. Supra Part III.A. 
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constitutional challenges to the individual mandate in the ACA.228  
That confidence was misplaced; the mandate survived only on the 
thinnest of judicial margins and only on tax, rather than Commerce 
Clause, grounds.229  Although the extinguishment theory in my view 
has no credible support in the statute, legal realism suggests that 
sophisticated litigation reformers may rehearse the argument to 
sympathetic judges.230 
Observation two.  Meaningful federal litigation reform does not 
require that the ACA extinguish claims; the same end may be served 
by reading the ACA to impose conditions that affect the availability or 
scope of judicial review.  Various versions of litigation reform 
arguments along these lines are easy to imagine.  A straightforward 
one is that the ACA requires that either internal or external review, 
or both, must be completed prior to state judicial review.  Alternately, 
the ACA could be argued to impliedly provide that the failure to 
exhaust internal or external review negatively affects the scope of 
court relief, the burden of proof, the available damages, or whether 
the arbiter is judge or jury. 
Consider a simple version of the argument.  The ACA requires 
all insurers to offer internal review, and imposes regulatory 
safeguards to ensure internal review is impartial and fair.  The 
check on poor internal review is for external review to have 
numerous features that ensure speedy and fair treatment of an 
insured’s claims.  Given that statutory approach, the argument will 
go, clearly Congress intended judicial review as a last resort and 
intended to preempt state law that does not sufficiently promote 
internal and external review over litigation.231 
                                                          
 228. As Professor David Hyman describes it:  “Virtually all law professors who 
opined on these issues agreed that all of the constitutional challenges to PPACA were 
meritless—and the federal courts would make short work of the litigation.”  David A. 
Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits against PPACA?, 2014 U 
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224364.  
 229. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) 
(upholding mandate on tax grounds); see also Gary Lawson, Night of the Living Dead 
Hand:  The Individual Mandate and the Zombie Constitution, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 
1700 (2013) (explaining that the individual mandate in the ACA survived on tax 
grounds, not on Commerce Clause or Necessary & Proper Clause grounds). 
 230. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct?  
Trend in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 668 (1993) 
(noting legal realism views the courtroom as an “arena” where important policy and 
substantive decisions are made that have a significant impact on litigation reforms 
and their political impact). 
 231. To be sure, requiring a claimant to complete an internal claim process whose 
contours are regulated by the government—and permitting a beneficiary to skip the 
process absent the insurer’s strict compliance with those government requirements—
may well be reasonable as policy matter.  Indeed, the more fair the internal process 
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The plain language of the statute, however, is not friendly to this 
argument.  The statute does not require that either internal or 
external review be anything more than an option.  The ACA requires 
that internal processes be “available,” and obligates insurers to 
provide an internal claims and appeals process, but does not require 
claimants to use those processes.232  Additionally, the implementing 
regulations presume that the question of exhaustion of internal 
review prior to external review is a matter of state law.233 
Similarly, the NAIC-UERMA is on its face quite clear that external 
review is an option, not a requirement.  Section 2 of the NAIC-
UERMA explains that the “purpose of this Act is to provide uniform 
standards for the establishment and maintenance of external review 
procedures to assure that covered persons have the opportunity for an 
independent review . . . .”234  Section 3 in turn defines a “covered 
person” as a “policyholder, subscriber, enrollee or other individual 
participating in a health benefit plan.”235  Section 5 provides that “a 
health carrier shall notify the covered person in writing of the 
covered person’s right to request an external review . . . .”236  Section 6 
requires that “all requests for external review shall be made in writing 
to the [state insurance commissioner]” and that “a covered person or 
the covered person’s authorized representative may make a request 
for an external review.”237 
Read plainly, the NAIC-UERMA—the model act the ACA assumes 
states will follow—makes external review an option only a claimant 
can exercise.  In the alternative, the claim can proceed in state court.  
Moreover, if a beneficiary chooses external review, although the 
external reviewer’s determination is binding on both the insurer and 
the claimant, NAIC-UERMA contemplates that external review is 
                                                          
is, and the more readily a beneficiary may seek outside review if the internal process 
is suspect, the less of a remedial burden it becomes.  Having a federally guaranteed 
option to do so is certainly consonant with protecting consumers.  Converting an 
option into a requirement may also be defensible policy, if the internal review 
process is cheap and impartial and thus saves money without sacrificing fairness.  
And such arguments may apply with stronger force to external review, because there 
is less of a risk of conflicted denials.  But the question is not what is the best policy; 
the question is what does the statute provide. 
 232. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)(1)(B) (2012) (referring to notice for “available” 
internal and external appeals processes). 
 233. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(iii) (2013) (“To the extent the State 
process requires exhaustion of an internal claims and appeals process, exhaustion 
must be unnecessary [under certain conditions that favor the consumer].”). 
 234. NAIC-UERMA, supra note 183, § 2 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 235. Id. § 3(N). 
 236. Id. § 5(A)(1) (emphasis added). 
 237. Id. § 6(A)(1), (B).  Elsewhere the NAIC-UERMA Model Act assumes that the 
invocation of external review will be done by the claimant or her representative.  E.g., 
id. § (7)(A)(1). 
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“binding . . . except to the extent [the insurer or the claimant] has 
other remedies available under applicable State law.”238  Per the 
specific language of the NAIC-UERMA, the availability and contours 
of judicial review of coverage disputes on individual policies is left 
entirely up to the states to specify; external review does not limit 
court remedies unless the law of a particular state says so.239 
Legislative history also undermines any theory that the ACA—by 
requiring internal and external review be available—intended to limit 
judicial review and concomitantly displace any state law that failed 
sufficiently to do so.  A Republican amendment to the House health 
care bill prepared by Minority Leader John Boehner specifically 
attempted to effect federal litigation reform by limiting judicial 
review of “health care lawsuits.”240  Boehner’s amendment, which was 
effectively health care legislation in itself, was entitled the “Common 
Sense Health Care Reform and Affordability Act,” and in pertinent 
part, envisioned a sweeping series of reforms that affected not just 
medical malpractice, but all manner of health care litigation 
including coverage denials.241  It provided that any “health care 
lawsuit” would be subject to damage caps, voided joint and several 
liability, limited attorneys’ fees, required clear and convincing proof 
of malice to recover punitive damages, and excused from preemption 
any state law that imposed greater procedural or substantive 
protections for health care organizations (which included insurers) 
than the Boehner bill.242  None of it was adopted. 
Observation three.  Insofar as federal power emanating from the ACA 
trumps state power over individual policies, it does so as a floor.  To 
understand this observation, it is helpful to briefly offer an example 
from the world of self-insured plans. 
Self-insured plans are entirely regulated by the federal 
government.243  On the matter of exhaustion, however, the ACA’s 
implementing regulations effected a significant change compared to 
                                                          
 238. Id. § 11(A)–(B).  
 239. Whether a state could, as a matter of state law, use procedural devices to 
strongly favor external review over judicial review depends on whether a state 
doing so would be offending the “minimum consumer protections” of the NAIC-
UERMA.  Supra Part III.B.2.  The current interpretation by federal authorities of 
the NAIC-UERMA minimum protections does not appear to bar states from 
engaging in such conduct.   
 240. H.R. REP. NO. 111-330, at 85–91 (2009) (setting forth sections 301–310 of the 
“Common Sense Health Care Reform and Affordability Act”). 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at 85–91 (setting forth pertinent provisions of Boehner’s amendment). 
 243. See supra Part III.A (explaining that the ACA incentivizes large employers to 
offer insurance and opens up the individual market to everyone).  The subsequent 
analysis also applies to group-insured plans. 
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the old ERISA rule.  Claimants against self-insured plans now need to 
exhaust internal processes only if such processes closely hew to the 
extensive protective regulations governing the internal review 
process.  Indeed, originally the ACA regulations required strict 
compliance by the plan with the internal regulations; absent strict 
compliance, a claimant could proceed directly to external review or 
judicial review.244  In the latter case, devastatingly for insurers, “the 
claim or appeal is deemed denied on review without the exercise of 
discretion by an appropriate fiduciary.”245  Firestone deference is only 
due if a fiduciary has exercised discretion.  Thus, under the 
formulation of the originally promulgated ACA regulations, if self-
insured plans did not strictly comply with federal regulations on 
internal review, they lost Firestone deference in court. 
In response to industry criticism of Firestone deference being 
conditioned on strict compliance, the Departments slightly revised 
their rule on exhaustion.246  But not much.  Under the rules currently 
in effect, exhaustion is excused, and deference lost in court, if the 
internal review process does not comply with the federal regulations 
governing internal review, unless such infirmity is de minimis, not 
likely to cause prejudice to the claimant, occurred for good cause and 
in good faith, and was not part of a pattern or practice of violative 
conduct.247  Although this is not the strict compliance the federal 
                                                          
 244. “[T]he July 2010 regulations permitted claimants to immediately seek 
review if a plan or issuer failed to ‘strictly adhere’ to all of the July 2010 
regulations' requirements for internal claims and appeals processes, regardless of 
whether the plan or issuer asserted that it ‘substantially complied’ with the July 
2010 regulations.” Group Health Plans Rules Relating to Internal Claims and 
Appeals and External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,213 (June 24, 2011) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 117).  
 245. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers 
Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,351–52 (July 23, 
2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (explaining that the initial July 2010 
regulations required strict adherence to internal review requirements, and that upon 
failure to do so, “[i]f a claimant chooses to pursue remedies under section 502(a) of 
ERISA[,] . . . the claim or appeal is deemed denied on review without the exercise of 
discretion by an appropriate fiduciary”). 
 246. Group Health Plans Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals and 
External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,213 (June 24, 2011) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 117) (“Consumer groups generally supported this ‘strict adherence’ 
approach, but the approach received a number of negative comments from some 
issuers and plan sponsors, who advocate a ‘substantial compliance’ approach.”).   
 247. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(F) (2013); see also 76 Fed. Reg. at 37 (“In 
response to comments, the Departments are retaining the general approach to this 
requirement, but this amendment also adds a new paragraph (b)(2)(ii)(F)(2) to the 
July 2010 regulations to provide an exception to the strict compliance standard for 
errors that are minor and meet certain other specified conditions.”). 
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agencies originally required in the initial July 2010 regulations, this 
effectively imposes a near-strict compliance standard on insurers. 
Now the relevance to state prerogative can be explained.  The ACA 
regulates internal review for all policies, including individual policies 
that are otherwise governed by state law.  With respect to compliance 
and exhaustion, the Departments could have left the treatment of 
that issue entirely to the states to resolve on their own, but they 
seemingly did not.  Instead, the ACA regulations governing internal 
review for individual policies provide that, absent near-strict 
compliance with federal regulations, “the claimant is deemed to have 
exhausted the internal claims and appeals process.”248 
This appears to be an attempt to ensure that states eager to favor 
internal review over external or judicial review cannot do so via state 
doctrines of exhaustion that too readily overlook insurer violations of 
internal review protocols.  How robust this protective effort will be—
that is, how resistant it will be to state efforts to circumvent it—is not 
clear.  But the point is that, to the degree the ACA and its 
implementing state regulations are displacing state authority, they are 
doing so in a way designed to protect insureds. 
It is not possible to predict precisely how extra-statutory impulses 
might affect the specific analyses set forth above.  Readers are invited 
to speculate how the above issues and disputes might be resolved in 
the real world, outside the pages of this Article.  Nevertheless, certain 
themes will serve useful in imagining how realist preference and 
statutory interpretation coherently interact.249 
IV. ACA LITIGATION REFORM THEMES 
The analysis in Part III.B was, by design, rooted in specifics.  It 
aimed to provide academics, judges, regulators, and practitioners 
with a functional understanding of the ACA on remedy as well as 
some concrete predictions regarding the most likely litigation reform 
battles.  By contrast, Part IV steps back and considers “themes” likely 
to be urged by litigation reformers and their opponents, either in 
connection with the specific disputes identified in Part III.B or as a 
launching pad for others. 
For purposes of this Article, the notion of a theme is 
straightforward.  Put simply, it is a larger story on remedy supposedly 
                                                          
 248. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(F)(1)–(2) (setting forth limits on use of 
exhaustion); id. § 2590.715-2719(c)(2)(iii) (explaining that state exhaustion rules 
are subject to § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(F)). 
 249. See infra Part IV (considering themes likely to be urged by litigation reformers 
and their opponents).  
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told by the ACA.  While thematic descriptions of statutes have been 
attacked as useless or harmful by various interpretative schools,250 I do 
not discuss themes here solely as formal interpretative prisms by 
which the ACA will be construed.  I regard themes as an essential way 
to understand the narratives litigation reformers and other 
stakeholders will offer.  The ACA is technical, complicated, and dry.  
And humans (including judges) are not tireless propositional robots.  
Narrative matters. 
The use of themes in this fashion is particularly useful with respect 
to a complicated federal statute like the ACA, one that affects both 
federal and state law.  As I explain in Part IV.A., the judicial device by 
which conflict between federal and state law is mediated is well 
known:  “preemption.”  The judicial means by which conflicts 
between federal laws are resolved does not have a tidy name; I prefer 
the term “intra-federal statutory conflict resolution.”  Both doctrines 
are fairly elastic and could serve as the hook by which the remedial 
themes discussed below could appear in judicial and regulatory 
interpretations of the ACA.251 
A. Flexible Jurisprudential Devices 
Preemption.  Preemption is the doctrine by which the winners in 
federal versus state law conflicts are chosen.  Preemption comes in 
two varieties:  express and implied.  Express preemption is when the 
federal statute specifies the degree to which it does or does not 
displace state law.252  The presence of an explicit preemptive clause, 
however, does not bar judges from engaging in an analysis of 
                                                          
 250. See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine:  In 
Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 396–97 (1996) (observing that textualist 
judges “give little weight to the purpose of a statute, the intent of Congress, or the 
current societal context in which the statute applies”).   
 251. Cf. Simon Lazarus, Stripping the Gears of National Government:  Justice 
Stevens’s Stand Against Judicial Subversion of Progressive Laws and Lawmaking, 106 
NW. U. L. 769, 772–79 (2012) (cataloging the methods by which conservative 
justices have used “a broad selection of doctrinal monkey wrenches to throw into 
the machinery of the modern progressive state” and “immuniz[e] businesses 
from private remedies under federal and state laws protecting customers, 
retirees, depositors, workers, and other individuals”). 
 252. Affirmative preemptive provisions are usually called “preemption” clauses.  
Preemption provisions that spell out where state law survives are often called 
“savings” clauses.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 727, 738 (2008) (explaining preemption clause nomenclature). 
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“implicit” preemption.253  Implicit preemption occurs when state law 
“conflicts” with federal law.254 
Conflict preemption is often sub-divided into “impossibility” and 
“obstacle” preemption.255  The variant of conflict preemption that will 
be at issue with respect to the ACA is “obstacle” preemption—where 
state law is preempted because it frustrates the “purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”256  Conflict-obstacle preemption arises both 
in respect to logically contradictory state laws as well as those that 
hinder or obstruct Congressional purpose.257 
The doctrine of preemption—and obstacle preemption in 
particular—is quite muddled.  Facially neutral principles like 
“formalism” or “textualism” do little work, even for those judges who 
proclaim their merits.258  And the more extensive the list of contact 
points between federal and state law, the higher the likelihood that 
obstacle preemption will be wielded by “free-ranging” realist 
judges.259  The ACA contains many contact points between federal 
and state law. 
                                                          
 253. See id. at 739 (referencing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 
861 (2000), and stating that “the Court . . . has held state law displaced even when 
the statute contains an express saving clause”). 
 254. Field preemption, a type of implied preemption, is when Congress so 
thoroughly regulates an area that it “occupies the field.”  Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 
555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (“Pre-emptive intent may also be inferred if the scope of the 
statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative field.”).  
Field preemption is extremely rare, though it has been applied to areas implicating 
national security, such as atomic energy.  See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy 
Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (applying field preemption 
in the area of atomic energy); Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 
F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) (same); see also Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 
F.3d 237, 243 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Courts rarely find field preemption . . . .”).  Field 
preemption is often (correctly) described as an area of implied preemption, see 
Merrill, supra note 252, at 739, but it could be express:  Congress could declare that it 
intends to exclusively occupy a field.  
 255. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228–30 (2000).  Impossibility 
preemption is extremely narrow because it refers to physical, rather than logical, 
impossibility.  Id. at 228.  Accordingly, “even if one sovereign’s law purports to give 
people a right to engage in conduct that the other sovereign’s law purports to 
prohibit, the ‘physical impossibility’ test is not satisfied [because] a person could 
comply with both state and federal law simply by refraining from the conduct.”  Id. at 
228 n.15 (emphasis added).  Impossibility preemption exists only when Sovereign A 
affirmatively requires Act Z and Sovereign B forbids Act Z.  Id.   
 256. Id. at 228.  
 257. Id. at 228–29.  
 258. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 
114 n.5 (noting that preemption serves as an “exception” to the Court’s embrace 
of textualism). 
 259. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 595 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(criticizing obstacle preemption as little more than a court’s “free-ranging 
speculation about what the purposes of the federal law must have been”); cf. Bates v. 
Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (urging restraint in implied 
preemption analysis so as to avoid converting the doctrine into “[a] freewheeling 
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The ACA incorporates some specific preemption provisions, but 
none appears to directly address coverage denial remedies.260  
Instead, state rules of remedy would be subject to the ACA’s general 
preemption provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d).  
Interestingly, that provision is facially written as an anti-preemption 
provision:  “Nothing in [Title I] shall be construed to preempt any 
State law that does not prevent the application of the provisions of 
this title.”261 
The meaning of the provision is unclear and prompts the question: 
why was it written in at all?  The common law of conflict preemption 
already displaces state law that (1) logically conflicts with federal law 
or (2) poses an obstacle that frustrates Congressional intent.  Does 
Congress’s use of the expression “prevent the application” intend 
something broader than, equal to, or narrower than the common law 
of conflict preemption?  Perhaps the latter.  Obstacle preemption has 
come under attack from both conservative and liberal scholars as a 
thinly veiled means to instantiate judicial policy preferences.262  
Perhaps Congress intended for § 18041(d) to curb, in some way, the 
use of obstacle preemption by judges to displace state law.  Yet 
neither the height nor slope of the curb contained in § 18041(d) is 
self-evident. 
Intra-federal statutory conflict resolution.  Scholars have often debated 
how different types of federal law interact—for example, treaties 
versus statutes, or statutes versus the federal rules of civil 
procedure.263  However, there has been little scholarly treatment as to 
how conflicts between federal statutes should be resolved.  In the 
                                                          
judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 260. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15 (2012) (involving tort reform demonstration 
projects); id. § 1320a-7h (involving physician transparency reports); id. § 18031(k) 
(involving regulation of exchanges). 
 261. Id. § 18041(d).  The statutory note makes clear that the reference to “this 
title” is to Title I of the ACA.  Title I added section 2719 to the PHSA, while Title X, 
enacted simultaneously, amended Title I, including section 2719.  The amended 
language was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19.  Some other preemption regulations 
in the ACA track this language.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18054(b)(32) (tracking 
preemptive “prevent the application” language).  
 262. “Commentators on the bench and in the academy have puzzled at the 
seeming incoherence of decrying reliance on a statute’s background purposes but 
finding state laws preempted as inconsistent with those purposes.”  John David 
Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369, 372 (2013); see also 
id. at 372–73 n.9 (identifying a range of commentators who have criticized the 
Court’s implied preemption analysis). 
 263. See, e.g., Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals 
Analysis:  A New Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and 
Federal Rules, 51 EMORY L.J. 677, 701–26 (2002) (describing the resolution of conflicts 
between federal rules of civil procedure and statutes). 
MAHER.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  2:41 PM 
704 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:649 
courts, various canons are invoked.  Statutes should be read in 
harmony where possible.264  Old laws yield to new.265  General statutes 
yield to specific ones.266  Implied repeal is disfavored.267  Yet how 
these canons interact, particularly when operating at cross purposes, 
is not clear.  Similarly unclear is how they apply with respect to ERISA 
and the ACA.268 
B. The ACA as Consumer Choice 
The ACA as consumer choice is a theme likely to be invoked by 
litigation reform opponents.  The story will go something like this:  
the ACA’s drafters intended to ensure that insureds had three robust 
and independent options for remedy—internal, external, and judicial 
review.  The legislation says nothing about one remedy limiting any 
other.  Under this thematic approach, rules that in practice limit a 
                                                          
 264. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988) (“The courts are not at 
liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes 
are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed 
congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”).   
 265. See Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing the canon 
as “[u]sually the older law yields to the newer”). 
 266. See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976) (“In a variety of 
contexts the Court has held that a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more 
general remedies.”); see also Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980) 
(referring to the “principle that a more specific statute will be given precedence over 
a more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence”); Radzanower v. Touche 
Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (noting the “basic principle of statutory 
construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not 
submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum”).  
 267. See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 551 (“[S]ince we ‘are not at liberty to pick and 
choose among congressional enactments . . . when two statutes are capable of 
coexistence,’ . . . we must conclude that the earlier, more specific provisions . . . were 
neither expressly nor implicitly repealed by the later, more general provisions . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 
103 n.12 (1964) (holding that “[a]mendments by implication . . . are not favored”); 
Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 US 497, 503 (1936) (explaining that “repeals by 
implication are not favored”).  But “if the later act covers the whole subject of the 
earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal 
of the earlier act.”  Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 154.  And “[i]t is common ground, or at 
least should be, that a later-enacted statute can confine the domain of an earlier 
one.”  Quinn v. Gates, 575 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 268. The matter is complicated further by ERISA’s anti-supercession provision, 
which provides that “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter, amend, 
modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States . . . or any rule 
or regulation issued under any such law.”  29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (2012).  The true 
scope of this clause is unsettled.  See, e.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l 
Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 375, (1990) (finding 29 U.S.C. §1144(d) inapplicable); 
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Medley, 572 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding 
that § 1144(d) subordinates ERISA to the later-enacted Americans with Disabilities 
Act).  In any event, the same nonlegal impulses that may motivate judges to 
expansively read ACA’s general preemptive provision vis-à-vis state law favoring 
insureds could motivate them to find reason to hold 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) inapposite 
in cases involving tension between ACA provisions favoring insureds and ERISA 
provisions that do not.   
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consumer’s choice to pursue one form of review will be argued to 
have been impliedly displaced or preempted by the ACA. 
To insist that insureds may choose which remedial track to pursue, 
with no constraint, is admittedly a tidy view of the ACA on remedy.  It 
is also appealing because it errs on the side of consumer fairness, 
favors individual choice, and encourages insurers and states to make 
non-judicial review processes as inexpensive, competent, and 
impartial as possible.269 
The challenges of this narrative, however, are twofold.  First, it 
implies the elimination of settled ERISA doctrine.  Recall that the 
ACA does not undo the rule that exhaustion is required for self-
insured plans, nor does it explicitly end deference to internal 
reviewers on matters outside external reviewers’ scope.270  The former 
is expressed as a matter of agency rule, while the latter is a natural 
implication of the regulations as written.  Both clearly draw from 
ERISA practice.  Perhaps regulators could change course, or liberal 
judges could reject agency regulations, with either bureaucrat or 
jurist having become taken with the consumer choice theme.  But I 
highly doubt it. 
I do not doubt, however, that a milder version of this consumer 
choice theme will be urged, perhaps with ultimate success.  The 
milder version will go something like this:  except where ERISA or 
the ACA’s implementing regulations clearly indicate otherwise, the 
presumption is that the ACA promotes consumer choice.271  This 
theme implies that the specific dominates the general.  Given the 
current inclinations of the American judiciary,272 this theme seems 
unlikely to immediately secure followers.  In coming years, however, 
the landscape may be quite different, particularly if there is a slight 
change in the composition of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
                                                          
 269. Individuals denied coverage are, with most claims, likely to want to obtain the 
promised benefit as quickly and cheaply as possible.  If internal review is truly fair—if 
Insurer A has a reputation for fairly and promptly resolving disputes—that option 
will be very often selected, and Insurer A will benefit compared to competitors 
perceived as more sharp-elbowed and thus more often subject to litigation.  Similarly, 
if a state does a poor job of ensuring its external reviewers are truly impartial, 
external review will attract a smaller audience, as it should.   
 270. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 271. So, for example, the ERISA plans’ ability to contractually modify policies so 
as to alter background rules—which prior to the ACA’s passage, was presumed to be 
fairly expansive, but was only confirmed in a few specific areas—would be, by dint of 
the ACA’s purpose, now very much limited:  contractual limit on consumer choice 
would be presumptively disfavored.  
 272. See supra Part I.C (noting significant judicial hostility to expansive remedies 
for plaintiffs).  
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Although I believe comprehensive remedy is important,273 I must 
admit that the ACA as consumer choice theme seems quite 
susceptible to overreach.  For example, the statute’s structure and 
text seemingly preserve ERISA’s remedial approach in some 
important—and, to me, disappointing—ways.274  More troubling is 
that the “ACA as consumer choice” theme could supply insufficient 
regulatory space for states to operate differing remedial regimes.  
Ensuring pure option-choice can be costly, and some states might not 
adjudge the benefits to be worth such costs.  It is also possible that 
some combination of the ACA’s three remedial options that falls 
short of undiluted choice may yield the “best” results.  While the ACA 
does provide a protective floor regarding remedy, preempting all 
state action that infringes upon the consumer’s choice regarding any 
of the three options may pay short shrift to traditional federalist 
virtues of experimentation and heterogeneous preference, and, in 
any event, exceed the legislation’s intent.275 
C. The ACA as Anti-Judicialism 
An attractive theme for litigation reformers will be that the ACA is 
generally hostile to judicial dispute resolution, by virtue of its 
extensive regulation of non-judicial processes.  The theme might 
animate two approaches to reform:  (1) to argue that the ACA 
modifies ERISA so as to further diminish ERISA’s judicial remedies; 
and (2) to argue that the ACA, by dint of exercising power over 
individual insurance policies, preempts state laws that do not 
sufficiently favor non-judicial review. 
As to the first approach—reading the ACA to further weaken 
ERISA’s remedial regime—consider the following.  Through the use 
of a series of judicial glosses, the Supreme Court has “interpreted” 
ERISA as creating a mandatory administrative scheme to handle 
coverage disputes.276  The ACA, in short, provides a much better 
administrative scheme.  It more strictly regulates internal review and 
creates an external review system that, on its face, demands 
                                                          
 273. On four separate occasions, I represented ERISA beneficiaries on the merits 
as parties before the Supreme Court:  Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
134 S. Ct. 604 (2013); US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013); 
Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010); and LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 
552 U.S. 248 (2008).  I have never represented an ERISA plan, fiduciary, or insurer 
in any capacity before the Court. 
 274. See supra Part II.C.   
 275. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Foreword:  Federalism All the Way Down, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 44–73 (2010) (describing the virtues of federalism). 
 276. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA as national 
litigation reform). 
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competent and impartial reviewers.277  It must, therefore, impose 
even greater limits on the use of judicial review than ERISA does, or 
so the argument goes. 
I do not specifically see a path for this approach to prevail; I see no 
identifiable place where the ACA modifies ERISA so as to further 
weaken the judicial review of claims.  That the ACA extinguishes all 
judicial remedy under ERISA is, as I have explained above, utterly 
unjustifiable.278  And I have, in the specific instances analyzed in Part 
III, expressed skepticism that the ACA in any way worsens the ERISA 
remedial regime.279  However, I cannot say that on this question the 
text and regulations are so clear as to foreclose any possibility that the 
ACA will be read as embodying this theme. 
The second approach—urging the ACA as a limiting force on state 
judicial remedies—is more troubling.  ERISA will no doubt serve as a 
point of reference.  One might think ERISA would be readily 
disregarded, given the difference in the preemptive structures of the 
two statutes.280  ERISA expressly and presumptively preempted large 
swathes of state law and also affirmatively provided a fairly detailed set 
of remedies (although not nearly so comprehensive as later decisions 
would pretend).281  The ACA does neither, and thus formally comes 
with a much weaker and narrower preemptive base. 
One would naturally expect that the preemptive “penumbra” of 
ERISA, i.e., its implied preemptive reach, to be larger than that of the 
ACA, just as larger objects cast bigger shadows.  But it all depends on 
the angle at which one shines judicial light on the statute.  Tiny 
objects can cast very large shadows if hit with light from certain 
angles.  Legal realism expects that judges will, for non-legal reasons, 
move the light. 
For example, converting the ACA’s federally guaranteed options of 
internal and external review into an ACA command (i.e., that state 
                                                          
 277. See supra Part II.A–B (outlining the internal and external review procedures 
in the ACA).  
 278. Supra Part III.B.3.  
 279. See supra Part III.  I cannot analyze every ambiguity or possibility, and perhaps 
some overlooked statutory crevice could support a rule where, for example, in some 
circumstances a judge acting in the aftermath of non-judicial review must offer 
something exceeding Firestone deference.  That is, a plaintiff might need to show 
something more than arbitrariness and capriciousness before a court were permitted 
to disturb the result of the non-judicial review.  Cf. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012) (setting 
forth extremely limited grounds under the Federal Arbitration Act by which a court 
may overturn arbitration award).  Moreover, my analyses in Part III may be wrong at 
the granular level.  And, finally, even in those cases where a specific analysis may have 
been “correct,” it may fall victim to realist impulses and themes. 
 280. See supra Part II.C (explaining the broad preemptions found in ERISA and 
the narrow preemptions found in the ACA).  
 281. See supra Parts I.B, II.C. 
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law governing individual insurance policies must make non-judicial 
review a pre-suit requirement) is a trick ERISA already performed.  
For the sake of comparison, remember that ERISA provides that a 
claimant must have an “opportunity” to utilize a “full and fair” 
internal claims review process.282  Nonetheless, that opportunity was 
merrily converted by the judiciary into a requirement that a claimant 
must use such a process before resorting to court.283 
Admittedly, under ERISA the exhaustion requirement occurred in 
part based on a misunderstanding of the statute’s relation to the 
Labor Management Relations Act, which required internal grievance 
exhaustion prior to suit.284  But just as in persuading judges to 
interpret ERISA with an improper reference to the LMRA, litigation 
reformers advancing an anti-judicial review theme might persuade 
judges to interpret the ACA with improper reference to ERISA.  
While ERISA constitutes still-controlling law with respect to key 
aspects of the regulation of self-insured and group plans, it has no 
controlling relevance whatsoever with respect to individual insurance. 
Litigation reformers will urge that judges consider the “teachings” 
of ERISA to “guide” interpretation of the ACA.  For example, here 
are the words of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
uttered over thirty years ago, in justifying the court’s reading of 
ERISA as requiring that claimants exhaust internal claim procedures 
before seeking judicial relief: “It would . . . be anomalous if the same 
good reasons that presumably led Congress and the Secretary to 
require covered plans to provide administrative remedies for 
aggrieved claimants did not lead courts to see that those remedies are 
regularly used.”285  Precisely the same reasoning could be offered in 
defense of reading the ACA to impose, via § 18041(d), limits on state 
power.  The steps are familiar:  the ACA provides more reliable and 
impartial means for non-judicial resolution of coverage disputes than 
does ERISA.286  It should, thus, be impliedly read to ensure that states 
cannot rob non-judicial review of the privileged position the ACA 
                                                          
 282. 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).   
 283. But see Maher, supra note 33, at 674–76 (arguing that, as both a textual and 
policy matter, it is unlikely that ERISA requires administrative exhaustion). 
 284. Professor Conison dismantled this argument over twenty years ago, 
explaining:  “the reference to section 301 of the LMRA does not mean that courts 
should import into ERISA the specific rules that have been developed under 
section 301.  Neither the Conference Report nor any other document suggests that 
Congress intended such a result or that such a reading of the passage is even 
remotely plausible.”  Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 
1, 16–17 (1992). 
 285. Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 286. Supra Parts I.A, II. 
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takes pains to grant it.  State law that fails to promote non-judicial 
review will be claimed to “prevent the application” of the ACA’s 
provisions insofar as it frustrates an asserted Congressional purpose 
of “maximizing” use of internal and external review. 
With respect to individual policies, consider a state’s failure to 
require the exhaustion of external review before judicial review, or a 
state’s choice to judicially resolve coverage disputes with no 
deference owed to external review.  Neither squarely prevents the 
application of any provisions of the ACA.  After all, the legislation 
explicitly and affirmatively codifies state prerogative regarding 
external review, and the cause of action in question is created by state 
law.287  Given that external review and the cause of action that leads 
to judicial review are both subject to state law, the relationship 
between external review and judicial review seems necessarily, by 
design, entirely a matter of state law.  But, after reading into the ACA 
an implicit Congressional purpose that the use of non-judicial review 
should be maximized, ACA’s general preemption clause could serve 
as the statutory ledge upon which reformers may seek to divest states 
of external review authority. 
Consider also internal review.  Regarding internal review, the ACA 
uses a more traditional approach to regulating state power; it adopts 
existing standards and directs federal agencies to further update such 
standards.288  Unlike with respect to external review, the ACA 
provides no explicit ongoing state carve-out.289  The ACA’s regulatory 
guidance assumes that states retain the prerogative to enact more 
consumer-protective rules.  That is, the federal agencies’ view of the 
ACA is that it serves as a floor.290  But the language of the ACA itself, 
unlike with respect to external review, does not explicitly provide that 
states possess residual authority to regulate the relationship between 
internal and judicial review.  It is certain that litigation reformers 
sounding the anti-judicial theme will cast state efforts to enact 
claimant-friendly rules as somehow “prevent[ing] the application” of 
the ACA merely by diminishing the importance of internal review.  
                                                          
 287. Supra Part III.B.2. 
 288. Supra Part III.B.3. 
 289. The explicit incorporation of state law for internal review is limited to state 
law in effect at the time of the ACA’s enactment:  March 23, 2010.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
19(a)(2)(B). 
 290. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage 
Relating to Status of Grandfathered Health Plans under the ACA, 75 Fed. Reg. 
34,538, 34,540 (June 17, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590) (“State laws that 
impose on health insurance issuers requirements that are stricter than the 
requirements imposed by the Affordable Care Act will not be superseded by the 
Affordable Care Act.”). 
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Assume, for example, that a particular state requires judges to 
interpret insurance contracts using contra proferentem without 
exception.  One expects arguments that such a state law would 
“prevent the application” of 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a) by discouraging 
people from fully participating in internal review processes. 
Some of the territory discussed above falls within the specific 
analyses undertaken in Part III.B, and seems to have little hope of 
success absent a strained reading of the preemption clause and a 
studied effort to avoid the implication of the implementing 
regulations.  But that is part of the point:  the anti-judicial theme 
draws its strength from a purposive analysis, potentially overwhelming 
more granular analyses of how the various remedial tracks interact. 
Given the statute as a whole, this theme is subject to superficially 
appealing purposive justifications, so much so that it may in practice 
be recast as something more palatable than an “anti-judicial” instinct.  
An enormous part of the debate over the ACA was whether it would 
reduce the cost of health care and health insurance.291  The latter was 
important to many observers not only because cost always matters, 
but also because of the ACA’s requirement that everyone purchase 
insurance.  If everyone has to purchase insurance, then immediately 
the cost of insurance becomes an even more scrutinized issue.292  
Anti-judicial reformers will argue that, because the ACA requires 
everyone to purchase insurance, judicial review is implicitly but 
significantly limited by the legislation; otherwise expansive judicial 
review would make insurance more costly, and unlike normal goods, 
there is no option not to buy it.  It will be effortless to find extensive 
passages of legislative history that describe one of the statute’s aims as 
reducing costs; the title of the Act itself includes the word 
“affordable.”  State laws that provide expansive judicial remedy, the 
argument goes, would frustrate this implied purpose of the ACA.  
Note the irony that this argument is a self-fulfilling prophecy on the 
“federal takeover” of health insurance.293 
A more sophisticated version of this theory might argue that states 
are, under the ACA, expected to foot the bill for essential health 
                                                          
 291. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 
72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 1393–95 (2011) (describing the hotly contested debate 
between supporters and opponents of the ACA about whether it would reduce the 
cost of health care). 
 292. The individual mandate is set forth in the ACA at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A 
(requiring purchase of coverage). 
 293. Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation:  State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 593 (2011) 
(describing various objectors as decrying a “‘federal’ takeover of health care”).  
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benefits above a certain floor.294  Although this “pay the freight” 
provision only explicitly applies to essential health benefits, which do 
not include rules of remedy, it might be conscripted in furtherance 
of establishing a general notion that the ACA disfavors expansive 
remedy beyond some indication that states can pay for it.  And since 
there is no obvious mechanism by which a state can pay for a more 
expansive remedy, the implication is that the ACA permits states to 
offer judicial remedies no more costly than those offered by ERISA.  
Otherwise, the ACA’s subsidies to individuals will in effect buy less 
actual health insurance coverage, because, presumably, states with 
more expansive remedy will have higher policy prices.  Features of a 
state law that might fall to or be limited by this type of argument 
include consequential and punitive damages, jury rights, the 
availability and level of judicial review, and burdens of proof. 
There are innumerable imaginable variations.  Each one, however, 
will amount to sub rosa litigation reform—limiting, nationwide, 
judicial remedy.  And that is why I have categorized this as an anti-
judicial theme, rather than one seeking to reduce consumer cost.  
Put simply, the objective is to limit judicial remedy, i.e., litigation.  
The challenges to this theme are, first, that neither specific provisions 
of the ACA nor the obvious intent of its implementing regulations, 
are friendly to it.  The second, again, is federalism.  It seems quite 
clear that almost all litigation-limiting rules urged in furtherance of 
this theme would fall within the discretion of states.295  The virtues of 
federalism do not wane when applied to remedy; that judicial 
preference for federalism by self-professed proponents often vanishes 
on questions of remedy is regrettable, not commendable.296  The ACA 
contemplates federalism over judicial policy preference; the anti-
judicial theme invites, of certain-minded judges, the opposite.  I hope 
that invitation will be declined. 
                                                          
 294. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(i)–(ii); see also Maher & Pathak, supra note 205, 
at 77 (explaining how the “pay-the-freight” provision works). 
 295. This runs counter to the “consumer choice” theme, which would scrutinize 
closely whether state law, by limiting judicial review, was meaningfully limiting a 
consumer’s remedial options.  If it were, consumer choice theme adherents would 
urge preemption.  I do not at this time see a specific justification for that view of 
preemption in the statute, but for practical reasons I have not analyzed the question 
in close detail.  Namely, the consumer choice theme represents a view of the ACA 
that may take root in the future (perhaps as soon as the next presidency, if a 
Democratic president succeeds President Obama) rather than today.  Given the 
current judiciary, it seems the primary battle will be between themes described in 
Parts IV.C (anti-judicialism) and IV.D (non-judicial justice). 
 296. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1762 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (remarking that the majority’s use of preemption to strike down 
California’s judicial rule regarding the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers 
in consumer contracts “do[es] not honor federalist principles”). 
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D. The ACA as Non-Judicial Justice 
A third theme, and a milder alternative to the two set forth in Parts 
IV.B and IV.C, might be called “the ACA as non-judicial justice.”  This 
theme draws upon the ACA’s extensive regulation of internal and 
external review to conclude that the legislation intends to ensure that 
coverage disputes must always, at the election of the insured, be 
resolvable by a competent and impartial non-judicial actor operating 
under fair procedures.  Beyond that core requirement, this theme leaves 
the remainder of remedial choices to be resolved by “residual 
authorities” whose power pre-dated the ACA:  by federal authorities in 
the self-insured context, by state authorities in the individual insurance 
context, and by a little of both in the group-insured context.297 
Supplemental state regulation that does not undermine the 
competence, impartiality, and fairness of non-judicial procedures 
would be permitted even if, in practice, it limited consumer choice.  
Similarly, residual authorities would resolve the proper role that 
litigation and judicial review are to play.  Under this view, a state 
might be within its rights to severely limit judicial review in the 
aftermath of a no-coverage finding by both the internal and external 
reviewer, absent some concrete showing by the plaintiff that 
malfeasance occurred.  In the other direction, a state might be 
entirely free to view internal and external review as entirely optional, 
adopting in practice the consumer choice view and leaving expansive 
judicial remedies fully intact in all circumstances.298 
This theme seems closest to what Congress intended, and largely 
but not entirely tracks the agency commentary preceding the 
implementing regulations.299  It also has the merit (or vice) of 
federalism.  If this theme dominates, litigation reform battles will 
                                                          
 297. See supra Part III.B.  The distinction between the two themes is subtle but 
important.  The “consumer choice” theme aims to provide consumers with a choice 
of options even where non-judicial review is fair.  The “non-judicial justice” theme is 
essentially indifferent to a consumer’s option for judicial review, if non-judicial 
review is reliably fair.  They shade together to the extent one argues that only robust 
judicial review can ensure non-judicial review is reliably fair. 
 298. Federal authorities would have less residual freedom to act, because they are 
confined in their choices by ERISA. 
 299. See, e.g., Group Health Plans Rules Relating to Internal Claims and Appeals 
and External Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37,208, 37,213 (June 24, 2011) (to be codified at 
45 C.F.R. pt. 117) (commenting that “[w]hen plans and issuers offer full and fair 
internal procedures for resolving claims, it is reasonable to insist that claimants first 
turn to those procedures before seeking judicial or external review of benefit 
denials”).  On the other hand, agency insistence that an exhaustion requirement not 
be permitted unless near-strict adherence to the internal review requirements are 
met—which applies to the states, see supra Part II.B, resembles more the “consumer 
choice” theme.  So perhaps the prevailing agency view lies somewhere between 
theme IV.B and IV.D, but closer to the latter. 
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largely occur in state legislatures and state courts across the country.  
One expects those battles to turn out very differently in Massachusetts 
than in Utah.  The challenge to this theme is that it is very difficult 
for anyone, including judges, to remain faithful to it; much more 
tempting is to adopt this theme at the top of an opinion and then 
carve out exceptions consistent with one’s policy preferences. 
CONCLUSION 
Perfectly clear and comprehensive statutes are the holy grail of law 
but as frequently found.  In reality, any piece of legislation is 
necessarily an imperfect representation of its drafters’ intentions.  
The Affordable Care Act is hardly an exception.  It is a sprawling 
enactment that incorporates by reference extraordinarily complex 
external authorities.  It is the product of a unique political process, 
one that did not include the fine tuning that precedes the adoption 
of many statutes.300  It is the most contentious legislation in decades.  
Litigation regarding what portions of its text “mean” is inevitable. 
Given the ubiquity and cost of health insurance disputes, of 
particular interest is the ACA’s treatment of remedies for insureds.  
This Article carefully identifies, for the first time, a series of 
interpretative fights to expect in the coming litigation to define 
litigation.  Some of the battles are esoteric but of great practical 
consequence.301  Others pose profound questions about federal 
versus state power and the judicial role in mediating it.  The biggest 
question of all may be the simplest:  will the ACA serve as an agent of 
nationwide litigation reform? 
Although the ACA does effect important changes to remedy, read 
correctly it does not impose a federal ceiling on state prerogative to 
fashion consumer-friendly remedies consistent with the policy 
preferences of the state.  The ACA is not federal litigation reform.  
The place for litigation reform in the world of the ACA is the states, 
                                                          
 300. See supra note 224. 
 301. Firestone deference is the best example of an obscure but important doctrine 
that the ACA alters and massively weakens. See infra Part III.B.2.  While the 
significance of this change has largely escaped academic comment, the Supreme 
Court will surely pay close attention.  Firestone deference has reached the Supreme 
Court on three occasions—in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108 
(1989) (articulating the principle); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 117 
(2008) (explaining that Firestone deference survives a conflict of interest); and 
Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 520–21 (2010) (explaining that Firestone 
deference survives fiduciary mistake)—and the current Chief Justice has written 
approvingly of the important functions it serves.  See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & 
Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 259 (2008) (Roberts, C.J, concurring) (applauding 
Firestone as desirable policy). 
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which retain great freedom to so act.  Federalism lives, in the very 
statute accused of killing it. 
So it should be construed, but strong extra-statutory forces 
complicate the picture.  Health care is still perceived as too 
expensive.  Traditional remedies are feared to be too volatile and too 
costly.  The Supreme Court seems to believe that non-judicial 
resolutions are cheaper and better than litigation.  And the 
antecedent example is worrisome.  ERISA, passed as a protective 
shield, was transformed by federal judges into a sword to separate 
approximately 150 million beneficiaries from protections otherwise 
provided by states.302  Much of that work was done by implicit, rather 
than express, authority.  Litigation reform proponents will seek to 
repeat that success.  The degree to which they will succeed is 
impossible to predict.  Even still, they may well be more successful 
than the 111th Congress intended.303 
 
                                                          
 302. See supra Part I.A.  
 303. I say this based both on the text and structure of the statute as well as the 
political circumstances of the legislation’s passage.  In the 111th Congress, the 
Democrats controlled both the House and Senate, and the ACA was signed by 
President Barack H. Obama, a Democrat.  Generally speaking, Democrats do not 
support litigation reform, let alone national litigation reform. 
